CONTEXT MATTERS: Latino Immigrant Civic Engagement in Nine U.S. Cities

Series on LATINO IMMIGRANT CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
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The intense debate on immigration policy in the United States in recent years has largely focused on how to regulate immigrants’ roles as workers, their impact on public spending, and how to reconcile labor market, community, and family needs with workable and humane law enforcement. These are important debates, and their outcome will determine the character of U.S. society for generations to come.

However, far less has been written about the role that immigrants play in the civic and political life of communities throughout the United States. This volume aims to fill that void by focusing on the contributions that Latin American immigrants are making to U.S. communities and the barriers they face in seeking to do so.

In the spring of 2006, a wave of immigrant mobilization showed that immigrants were capable of taking disciplined civic action on a massive scale. According to the most conservative press estimates, at least three-and-a-half to five million people took to the streets, with virtually no reports of violence. Participants included citizens, legal residents and undocumented migrants. In their efforts to influence U.S. public policy and perceptions, they demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to working within the U.S. political process.

This mass entry of primarily Latin American immigrants into the U.S. public sphere appeared to be largely spontaneous. Yet in many cities the size, speed, and discipline of the public presence were made possible by years of quiet community organizing and coalition-building, as immigrant-led organizations consolidated and reached out to U.S. civil society counterparts.

Nonetheless, the way that Latin American immigrants have become engaged within their local communities varies considerably across the country. In some cases, local institutions—government, churches, labor unions, and business networks—have partnered with recent immigrants from Latin America to facilitate their entry into civic and political life. In other cases, these institutions have been absent, less engaged, or sometimes even hostile to their incorporation. We argue that the context that immigrants face in their local communities helps shape the way and the extent to which they become active participants in public life.

This publication is based on a detailed study of nine cities in the United States as well as additional commissioned research on
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Specific areas of immigrant civic and political participation. Reports have already been published in each of these cities in collaboration with partner organizations, and several additional research papers are also available. A full list of the reports and the partner organizations can be found in the Appendix, as well as at the project’s website at www.wilsoncenter.org/migrantparticipation.

This project was funded by a generous grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and based at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Latin American Program and Mexico Institute. It has been led by Xóchitl Bada of the University of Illinois at Chicago, Jonathan Fox of the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Andrew Selee of the Woodrow Wilson Center. Robert Donnelly at the Wilson Center served as the project coordinator, a role previously played by Kate Brick.

NOTES

1 For specific data see Chart 8.1 in Xóchitl Bada, Jonathan Fox, and Andrew Selee, eds., Invisible No More: Mexican Migrant Civic Participation, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and University of California, Santa Cruz, July 2006.
Dominant media and policy debates have long tended to exclude Latin American immigrant voices. Critics frame them as threats to the English language, competitors for jobs, or simply criminals. Until recently, even sympathetic portraits often framed immigrants primarily as strivers who work hard for the dream of a better life for their children, or as victims deserving of humanitarian concern, but not as civic and political actors in their own right. Until the spring 2006 wave of public mobilization, the broader U.S. society tended to ignore immigrants’ capacity to represent themselves directly in the public sphere. This unprecedented process of “coming out” revealed that immigrants are capable of taking disciplined civic action on a vast scale.

At least three-and-a-half to five million people took to the streets that spring, with virtually no reports of violence or arrests, according to the most conservative English-language press estimates. Participants included citizens, legal residents, and undocumented migrants—many in the same families. Indeed, U.S.-born Latinos participated on a massive scale; surveys found that second- and third-generation Latinos were as likely to participate as the foreign-born. By the May 1 peak of the cycle of mobilization, many hundreds of thousands heeded the call to send a collective message that they wanted to be “good citizens,” by wearing white and waving U.S. flags.

In their efforts to influence U.S. perceptions and public policy, they demonstrated an unprecedented commitment to working within the mainstream U.S. governance process, following the civics textbook process of “how a bill becomes law.” In many, if not most of these cities—especially in the Sun Belt, but even in Chicago—the spring 2006 mobilizations were not only the largest immigrant rights mobilization ever. They were the largest mass public protest on any issue, ever.

For many observers, this mass entry of primarily Latin American immigrants into the U.S. public sphere appeared to be largely spontaneous—a defensive response to a bill passed by the House of Representatives that promised to criminalize both immigrants and their U.S. allies (HR 4437). The specter of nuns, nurses, and teachers being hauled off to jail loomed large, leading the archbishop of Los Angeles, Cardinal Roger Mahony, to openly threaten mass civil disobedience in the pages of The New York Times if HR 4437 became law.
Even immigrant community leaders were surprised by the scale of the public response. Yet in many cities, the size, speed, and consistent messaging of immigrants’ collective action was made possible by their years of quiet community organizing and coalition-building, as immigrant-led organizations consolidated and reached out to U.S. civil society counterparts—especially U.S. Latino allies. In the process, generational differences became visible, between those who had led the 1970s’ wave of Latino civil rights campaigns, and those who had honed their organizing skills following the post-1986 mass regularization of unauthorized immigrants under President Reagan. As an important precedent, these two generations had come together in 1994 to challenge California’s Prop. 187. In 2006, they came together again—but this time primarily under immigrant leadership.

At least partly in response to the immigrant rights protests, HR 4437 did not become law. Yet the power to block a hard-line law did not translate easily into capacity to promote a legislative reform. Instead, the following three years witnessed a legislative stalemate—as neither campaigners for criminalization and mass deportation nor advocates of comprehensive immigration reform managed to mobilize a winning coalition in Congress.

Observers asked challenging questions after 2006—among them: Why was the mass public mobilization not repeated? For some, the widespread fear generated by stepped-up workplace raids explained much of the reticence. Others’ questions were based on different assumptions, wondering how 2006 was possible at all. Yet no single factor accounts for either the ebb or the flow of street protest, which is just one tactic in the broader repertoire of civic engagement.

Locally, in the hundreds of cities and towns that had experienced thousands of residents filling the streets on May 1, 2006, subsequent trends varied widely. In some cities, immigrant civic engagement broadened and deepened, especially in large, traditional gateway metropolitan areas such as Chicago and Los Angeles, where citizenship applications from permanent residents soared. The Spanish-language communications media mobilized as never before, promoting citizenship with their “Now’s the time!” campaign (“Ya Es Hora”). In contrast, in many medium-sized cities, such as Charlotte and Omaha, where for the first time thousands of immigrants had felt safe enough to “come out” in 2006, the dominant subsequent trend was fear. Federal enforcement of immigration law in the heartland ratcheted up to an unprecedented degree. The total number of removals of unauthorized immigrants rose 27 percent from 2006 to 2008.

The spring 2006 marches revealed a process that had been taking place often silently but consistently: the emergence of Latin American migrants as actors in American civic and political life. They have done so by creating new migrant-led organizations, such as hometown associations, non-profits, faith-based organizations, indigenous right groups, community media and their own workers’ organizations—as well as by joining existing U.S. organizations, such as community associations, churches, unions, business associations, civil rights organizations, and media groups. In the process, they are transforming these U.S. institutions, as other immigrant groups have done throughout American history. By the turn of the century, many Latin American migrant organizations pursued two-track strategies, sustaining their commitments to their communities of origin while working to improve their home communities in the United States. This is the kind of dual engagement that can be understood in terms of practices of “civic binationality.”
Yet the spring 2006 wave and its diverging aftermaths underscore how little is known about the current process of immigrant integration in the United States. Different political cultures associated with national origin matter, but analysts are still not sure how. Differences across region and city in the United States also count, but analysts are still not sure how. What is clear, however, is that long-distance engagement in home-country issues, once assumed to undermine civic participation in the United States, is now increasingly recognized as encouraging participation in U.S. civic life. It turns out that joiners are joiners, even when they move from one society to another.

This applied research project attempts to contribute to our understanding of patterns of immigrant integration by taking a comparative approach to analyzing Latin American migrant collective action in the United States. Most often in migration studies comparative analysis refers to one specific approach, the comparison of different national origin groups. This approach, most often used in survey research, has generated rich findings. Yet the migrant population in the United States is so large, and so diverse, that national-origin averages can mask other key variables, such as ethnicity, sub-national region of origin, or region of settlement. For example, migrants from different Mexican states organize hometown associations at widely varying rates. Meanwhile, some U.S. cities have hundreds of hometown associations, notably Chicago and Los Angeles, while others have very few, such as Fresno. Latin American migrants of indigenous and Afro-Latin American origin organize differently. Even among indigenous Latin Americans, members of some ethnic groups organize much more than others, and in some regions of the United States more than in others. Sectoral differences may also matter, insofar as participation trends need to be compared across hometown associations, worker organizations, neighborhood associations, or religious communities.

In the literature on naturalization and voting patterns of new citizens, it turns out that implicitly homogeneous national samples can hide significant regional differences. Notably, a path-breaking study of immigrant civic and political participation trends in the 1990s found that legal immigrants in California were much more likely to become citizens and to vote than those in Texas and Florida—mainly due to California’s much more politicized environment and the perceived threat to Latinos posed by three successive ballot initiatives. These cross-regional differences in immigrant naturalization and voting trends only become visible once one takes a comparative approach—across regions, sectors, and patterns of participation.

In contrast to the dominant research focus on the characteristics that immigrants bring with them, the focus here is instead on variation at the receiving end. The punch line for understanding immigrant civic engagement, in other words, is that “context matters.” Inspired by this approach, this report synthesizes the results of a study of Latino immigrant civic engagement across nine different cities.

The focus on a diverse array of cities was intended to inform comparative analysis by highlighting varying patterns of civic engagement. The project included both traditional immigrant gateway cities, such as Los Angeles and Chicago, as well as centers of rapidly growing new settlement, such as Las Vegas, Omaha, and Charlotte. The cities’ sizes also ranged from vast metropolitan areas to regional centers. While the U.S. Latino communities in some of the cities are longstanding, as in Fresno, San Jose, and Tucson, they are much more recent
in others, as in the case of Washington, DC. As a result, in some cities immigrants join large, well-established Latino communities, whereas in others they unsettle long-standing black-white paradigms. Substantial Asian immigrant communities, especially in California, add to the varied panoramas of civic engagement. The nine city experiences documented in the reports that accompany this overview, while by no means a “representative sample” of the diversity of local contexts for immigrant civic engagement, offer a robust picture of the uneven terrain within which immigrants decide whether and how to engage in civic action.

NOTES

1 Thanks very much to Myrna Martínez Nateras for comments on an earlier version of this essay. The chapter title and book title were inspired by conversations with Prof. Ricardo Ramírez of the University of Southern California.


4 For example, on May 1, 2006 in San Jose, reporters found that U.S. flags outsold Mexican flags at a rate of 5 to 1. See: Patrick May, Mary Anne Ostrom and Rodney Foo, “A Call for Rights: Bay Area Rallies: Demands Ring Out From San Francisco to Salinas for Fair Reforms,” San Jose Mercury News, May 2, 2006.


9 This does not include border apprehensions, which dropped 35 percent during the same


14 In addition to the studies cited in note 5, for more on “context matters,” see also Bloemraad’s comparison of immigrant integration patterns in the United States and Canada in Irene Bloemraad, *Becoming a Citizen: Incorporating Immigrants and Refugees in the United States and Canada*, (Berkeley: University of California, 2006). She shows that immigrants with similar characteristics follow different civic pathways, depending on the context of their integration. It turns out to matter whether governments actively encourage immigrant integration. See also the recent studies in S. Ramakrishnan, S. Karthick, and Irene Bloemraad, Eds., *Civic Hopes and Political Realities: Immigrants, Community Organizations and Political Engagement*, (New York: Russell Sage, 2008). Many of these studies address locally specific contexts for engagement; they title one section, “The importance of place.” Along similar lines, an entire issue of the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* addresses “Local Contexts of Immigrant and Second-Generation Integration in the United States,” vol. 35, no. 7, 2009.

Coalitions refer to groups of organizations that come together to pursue shared goals—in spite of possibly different constituencies, strategies, and tactics. To understand immigrant civic engagement, one needs to explore both how different kinds of immigrant organizations work together, as well as how they collaborate with non-immigrant allies. The breadth of participation in the 2006 marches reflected a de facto coalition between Latin American immigrants and U.S. Latinos. A survey of Chicago May 1 protest participants revealed that most reported that they were U.S. citizens. A survey of Los Angeles participants reported that 38 percent were English-dominant. Both marches also involved relevant minorities of non-Latino participants.

One reason that “context matters” greatly for immigrant civic engagement is that coalition possibilities vary widely across cities and regions. “Immigrant-friendly” U.S. institutions are much stronger in some areas than in others. Notably, the presence of the Catholic Church, labor unions, and the Spanish-language broadcast media maps very unevenly across the U.S. landscape. Most importantly, the breadth and density of immigrants’ most consistent coalition partners, the institutions of U.S. Latino civil society, vary greatly across cities and states—as does U.S. Latino capacity for political representation.

The *Ya Es Hora* citizenship campaign, which followed the 2006 marches, is an especially notable example of a cross-sectoral coalition between U.S. and immigrant-led institutions that mapped unevenly across the United States. This unprecedented effort brought together organizations with complementary constituencies and skills, notably Spanish-language broadcast media, the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, trade unions such as SEIU, and city-based immigrant rights coalitions.

The uneven terrain of the context for reception of immigrants is highly relevant because, while immigrants have clearly demonstrated their capacity to build their own social and civic institutions, their capacity to take the next step and create political space, legitimacy, and voice in the policy process requires building coalitions with established U.S. institutions. The creation of this shared space at the city level, in turn, can reshape the environment within which immigrants decide when and how to become more involved with civic life.
This “virtuous circle” represents one significant pathway for immigrant integration—yet one that will only be discovered and understood if patterns of civic engagement are “unpacked” at the local level, as the nine different city reports in this series try to do. It is no coincidence that many of the key players in the buildup to the 2006 wave of mobilization were called something like the “[Fill in the name of your city] Coalition for Immigrant Rights.” In city after city, these coalitions brought together church, labor, and Latino civil rights groups with immigrant-led community-based organizations. Yet in each city, the relative weights of the different coalition partners varied greatly. Labor was a major player in cities where union density is higher, such as Los Angeles, San Jose, Chicago and Las Vegas—and almost invisible where organized labor is weak, as in Fresno, Omaha and Charlotte. The Catholic Church was very involved in some cities, yet kept a low profile in others, such as Charlotte, Omaha and Las Vegas. In Fresno, the bishop came out against HR 4437, and a key march started at a church with a priest’s blessing. Yet even in cities where the Catholic hierarchy was committed to supporting immigrant rights, such as Los Angeles, there was wide variation in levels of engagement from one parish to another. While Latino and immigrant youth were heavily involved across the board, their capacity to have a seat at the table in local coalitions varied widely—even leading to inter-generational conflict in some cases, as in Las Vegas. The role of elected officials also varied widely, depending on whether the cities were traditionally immigrant-friendly gateways such as Chicago, as well as on the degree to which Latinos were underrepresented in local and state politics, as in the cases of Fresno and areas of new settlement, such as Omaha and Charlotte.

While coalitions with U.S. organizations and institutions are crucial for immigrant empowerment, immigrants themselves are likely to have more policy influence insofar as they are also able to build coalitions among their own diverse forms of organizations. The concept of “migrant civil society” refers to the growing arena of migrant-led social and civic organizations—a space marked by the convergence between broad-based membership organizations, nonprofit support organizations, and community-oriented media, which often come together to create their own autonomous public spaces for cultural, social and civic expression. When these distinct forms of organization and representation forge partnerships for mutual support, they are building their own coalitions within migrant civil society. This capacity to come together among immigrant groups is especially important where allies in other sectors are politically weak. In Fresno, for example, U.S. Latino civil society remains politically weak, and cultural gaps also persist between Mexican-Americans and immigrants. As a result, coalition options were limited in 2006, and Fresno’s migrant organizations mobilized largely on their own, pulling off what was by far the largest protest march in the city’s history.

While some coalitions are long-standing, others are more ephemeral—as in the case of many of the groups that came together to promote the 2006 wave of mobilization. Clearly, the threat posed by hard-line legislation brought together groups in 2006 that had not worked closely before, and some have not collaborated since. Some cities even experienced competing protest coalitions, which though inconvenient for organizers and perhaps confusing to some participants, is also testimony
to the diversity of views within migrant civil society and its allies.

The role of threat in bringing potential allies together is a two-edged sword. Clearly, a sense of urgency encourages groups to overcome differences for the sake of broader shared goals, and helps to explain the unexpected breadth of community participation in 2006. At the same time, however, when the shared threat is lifted, fault lines and limitations are exposed. Moreover, groups with different constituencies and strategies may also have very different ideas about how to pursue ostensibly shared goals. These differences resurfaced when the debate shifted from opposing 2005 legislation that was universally seen as a threat to the question of how best to support comprehensive immigration reform. In some cases, different perceptions of the tradeoffs between what was possible versus what was desirable led to the emergence of parallel coalitions. In Los Angeles, for example, one coalition called for comprehensive immigration reform, while another supported full amnesty. Yet some of the coalitions that brought together very different constituencies—at first in response to threats—have managed to survive over time, thanks to shared leadership visions and consistent cross-cultural trust-building efforts.

Coalition dynamics are also influenced by the inherent tension between community-based groups, whose leaders can be held accountable by their constituencies, and national policy advocacy groups, whose deep involvement in the policy process can lead them to be more inclined to accept the difficult compromises required to build a winning legislative coalition.

Another key factor that shapes coalitional possibilities is the availability of philanthropic resources to support initiatives that can build trust and help to find common ground among diverse constituencies. This too varies greatly from city to city. The philanthropic sector in large, traditional immigrant gateway cities tends to be much more open to investing in immigrant integration, notably in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City. Uneven access to resources in turn reinforces the gulf that separates large, multi-ethnic cities from smaller cities and towns.

In brief, coalition dynamics among immigrant organizations are deeply influenced by a challenge shared by many other civic and social movements throughout the hemisphere. In Latin America, this challenge is known as the difficult transition “from protest to proposal.” In the process of deepening democracy, when outsiders manage to become insiders, or at least get access to insiders, they often find that the skills and repertoires that worked so well in the street need to be retooled if and when the opportunity arises to try to reform the state. In the case of immigrant civic engagement in the United States, the strategies and tactics that led to an unprecedented wave of collective action in 2006 encountered much less resonance in 2009. Yet in the intervening years, many of the key local coalitions recognized that protest was not enough. They shifted gears, focusing their energies on encouraging citizenship for eligible permanent residents, voter education, and turnout. Immigrant naturalization and voter turnout trends in 2007 and 2008 suggest that they made a difference. Nevertheless, the impact of immigrant civic coalitions on the policy process will depend heavily on dynamics that unfold far from most immigrant communities, as congressional representatives from swing districts with few immigrant voters may have the last word on comprehensive immigration reform.
NOTES

1 Coalitions are partnerships among distinct actors that coordinate action in pursuit of shared goals. Successful collective action in civil society often depends on the formation and survival of coalitions—insofar as the whole becomes greater than the sum of the parts. See Jonathan Fox, “Coalitions and Networks” in Helmut Anheier and Stefan Toepler, eds., International Encyclopedia of Civil Society, (New York: Springer Publications, 2009).


3 See Kim Dionne, Elizabeth Carlson, Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Darin DeWitt, Ryan Enos, and Michael Stone, “The Different Movers in a Social Movement: Survey data from the May 1 immigration rallies in Los Angeles,” (Unpublished study by researchers affiliated with the University of California, Los Angeles’ Department of Political Science), http://www. allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/0/9/6/0/p209604_index.html.

4 For example, the number of Latinos elected to state and federal legislatures rose by 50 percent between 1996 and 2007, according to the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Education Fund. See chapter 3 in this volume. However, the pattern of representation appears to be highly geographically concentrated.


6 In Fresno, for example, not even the UFW got involved in planning the 2006 marches. (Myrna Martínez Nateras, personal communication, September 9, 2009).


9 According to Dean Williamson, a senior member of the Fresno police department, “There was very good communication between the organizers of the events and with city staff. Fresno does not have many organized protests. I have worked for the city for thirty-one years, and I believe the May 1, 2006 protest was the largest and most peaceful” (personal email communication, June 16, 2006).

10 This difference in strategy was accompanied by differences in tactics. The coalition
with the more radical goals also called for a boycott and strike on May 1, 2006. This led many immigrant-based unions to keep their distance, since they are constrained by law from calling their members off their jobs. See Cassandra Engeman, “Social Movements and Organizations in Relation: Local Union Involvement in Immigrants’ Rights Movements in Los Angeles,” (paper presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meetings, August 9, 2009).

11 Consider the notable statewide alliance between Oregon’s coalition of immigrant worker rights groups and the state’s rural network of defenders of gay and lesbian rights, which have collaborated for more than a decade. See Lynn Stephen, Jan Lanier, Ramón Ramírez, and Marcy Westerling, Building Alliances: Collaboration Between CAUSA and the Rural Organizing Project (ROP) in Oregon, (New York: New York University, Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, Research Center for Leadership in Action), http://wagner.nyu.edu/leadership/change/research_products.php.

12 See, for example, Manuel Pastor and Rhonda Ortiz, “Immigrant Integration in Los Angeles: Strategic Directions for Funders,” (University of Southern California, Program for Environmental and Regional Equity and Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration, January, 2009), http://csii.usc.edu/publications.html. More generally, see the work of the funders’ affinity group, Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees at http://www.gcir.org/. They define immigrant integration “as a dynamic, two-way process in which newcomers and the receiving society work together to build secure, vibrant, and cohesive communities. We utilize the term ‘integration’ rather than ‘assimilation’ to emphasize respect for and incorporation of differences, the importance of mutual adaptation, and an appreciation of diversity.” See also a special issue of the journal Nonprofit Quarterly, Summer, 2009, on private foundations and immigration.
CHAPTER 3

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS INFLUENCE INTEGRATION OUTCOMES

Xóchitl Bada

Immigrant integration is one of the most overlooked issues in U.S. governance and local economic development. Currently, there is no national integration policy and local and state governments face the need to design their own programs to encourage immigrants to become civically engaged and participate more fully in their new societies. According to the American Community Survey of 2007, 53 percent of the foreign-born population come from Latin America. In this study we observed great variation in state and local government policies towards Latino immigrant integration. As a general trend and regardless of size, cities with historical traditions of Latino immigration, such as Chicago, Los Angeles, Fresno, and San Jose, are more likely to address the needs of new Latino immigrants than places with smaller historical flows like Charlotte, Omaha, the Washington, DC metropolitan area, and Las Vegas. In most cities with a previous history of Latino immigration, it is relatively common to find bilingual services, legal services, or modest government-sponsored programs to welcome immigrants.¹ The only exception is Tucson in the state of Arizona, one of the eight states across the nation that has enacted punitive anti-immigrant legislation.²

In the absence of federal policies that effectively address the social integration of foreign-born legal residents, as well as the issue of undocumented immigrants, state legislatures continue to tackle immigration issues in several arenas. In fact, immigrant-related legislation introduced at the state level has increased dramatically in the last five years. In 2005, approximately 300 bills were introduced and 45 passed state legislatures; whereas in 2009, approximately 1,500 were being considered in all 50 states with at least 222 laws and 131 resolutions being enacted in 48 states (see Figure 1). In the last four years, enacted legislation related to immigrants has mostly been related to identification/driver’s licenses, health, employment, human trafficking, law enforcement, public benefits, and education.³

So far, the track record of state legislatures for enacting immigration-related laws has produced a mix of progressive integrating policies and anti-immigrant enforcement laws aimed at cracking down on undocumented immigration and curtailing immigrants’ basic rights. Unfortunately, the media have overlooked some of the proposals designed to promote immigrant integration. In an analysis of 1,059 immigration-related bills and resolutions intro-
duced in state legislatures in 50 states in 2007, researchers found that legislations expanding immigrant rights were enacted at a higher rate (19 percent of 313 bills) than policies contracting immigrants’ rights (11 percent of 263 bills; see Figure 2).

In 2007, one year after the massive immigrant mobilizations of 2006, states with the largest foreign-born populations, such as California, New York, and Texas were more likely to introduce legislation to expand immigrant rights, regulate human trafficking, and address integration policy and the provision of language-access services than legislatures in new destination states, such as South Carolina and Nevada, where bills contracting immigrant rights were the most popular type of measure introduced. Finally, 60 bills expanding the rights of immigrants were enacted that year and only 3 percent of the bills designed to expand immigrants’ rights were rejected by legislators. This trend is highly consistent with our observations in the nine cities included in the study.

In the six states and the District of Columbia, where our study’s cities are located, we found a wide spectrum of state government responses to Latino immigrant integration—ranging from punitive measures in Arizona to integrative policies in California and Illinois. One key finding was that policy is often shaped by the breadth of organizing efforts. Cities with long histories of Latino immigration and pro-immigrant local and state legislation have more vibrant Latino-led immigrant organizations, which are interested in creating synergies with local and state government, as well as increasing participation in the areas of: education, housing, health, workforce development, voter registration, English-language acquisition, and citizenship workshops.

In 2005, Illinois enacted the New Americans Initiative, a bipartisan initiative aimed at facilitating immigrant integration across the state. Among other things, the initiative seeks to encourage citizenship acquisition among eligible permanent residents, provides funds for English-language instruction, and establishes an Office of New Americans to coordinate policies, actions, planning, and programs of state government with respect to immigrant integration and the impact of national immigration policy. The first director of this office was a naturalized Mexican immigrant who had previously been president of the Federation of Michoacán Hometown Associations in Illinois, a thriving immigrant organization with a binational civic engagement agenda.

This state government office consults regularly with local immigrant organizations to determine the best strategies to improve services for immigrant families in the areas of language instruction, citizenship acquisition, civic engagement, healthcare access, childcare, education, bilingual services, and workforce development. Recognizing that immigrants from Latin America comprise half of the foreign-born population in the state, Illinois enacted the Latino Family Commission in 2007, which works as a consulting body to improve and expand existing policies, services, programs, and opportunities for Latino families.

One important outcome of the new pro-integration strategies was the inauguration of the first Illinois Welcoming Center in Melrose Park, a Chicago suburb where many Latino immigrants have settled in the past decade. However, the economic recession and related state budget cuts stopped plans for opening new centers.

The Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (ICIRR), a Chicago-based advocacy organization, was instrumental in the im-
mentation of the New Americans Initiative (NAI), serving as the liaison between the government and hundreds of local immigrant and faith-based organizations in the state.

ICIRR is currently coordinating a non-profit partnership with the state to help eligible immigrants become naturalized citizens with free assistance. According to Luvia Quiñones, former assistant director of the NAI, the program has processed 39,000 applications since its inception, assisting thousands of Latino, Polish, and Asian immigrants. Despite the national visibility of the program and its great success in increasing the number of naturalized citizens in the state, demand is greater than available resources. By 2009, the program had only been able to help approximately 10 percent of those eligible to apply for citizenship.5

Since the program started, ICIRR has received $3 million per year in state funds to finance the citizenship programs of various community-based organizations across the state. However, given the effect of the current economic recession on the state budget, the citizenship program might face a 60-percent budget cut.6

In the summer of 2009, acknowledging the discrimination experienced by Mexican immigrants and naturalized U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry who came to Illinois and the Midwest in the early twentieth century, Governor Pat Quinn signed Senate bill 1557, a law requiring U.S. history courses in K-12 education throughout the state to include information about the Mexican repatriations during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The initiative was sponsored by Illinois State Senator William Delgado (D-Chicago) and the initiative was publicly announced in the fall by Governor Quinn during a special event at Morton East High School, located in Cicero, a Chicago suburb whose Latino population went from 36 percent in 1990 to 77.4 percent in 2000.

In general, our study found that large cities tend to be more tolerant towards Latino immigrants in comparison to medium-size and smaller urban areas. A good case in point is the somewhat integrative immigration policies enacted by the District of Columbia, compared to some counties in the metropolitan area, including Prince William and Loudoun counties in Virginia, and Frederick County in Maryland. Local immigration policies often become more restrictive the farther a community is from the metropolitan core.7 Some of these counties have experienced rapid foreign-population growth in the past decade or two—with little prior immigration—and some communities have decided to address this problem by enacting anti-immigrant campaigns. For example, in the state of Virginia, in the absence of comprehensive immigrant integration policies, anti-immigration organizations, such as Help Save Fairfax and Help Save Herndon, have been established as a response to contextual changes, such as increased demographic diversity.8

Indeed, the rapid increase of immigration-related state laws introduced across the country in the last four years has shown a bifurcated pattern of integration and immigrant exclusion, where newer areas of settlement have promoted fewer integrative measures compared to areas of traditional settlement where strong immigrant associations are present. For instance, the state of Pennsylvania—a state considered a relatively new destination for Latin American immigrants—is home to 32 of the 104 proposed local anti-immigrant ordinances.9 Throughout the country, at the municipal level, 74 pro-immigrant ordinances had been passed while only 55 restrictionist ones had been approved as of July of 2007 (see Table 1). Nevertheless, at the national level signs gen-
eraly point to an increased interest by local governments to enact legislation and programs aimed at integrating immigrants more fully into local communities.

In 2008, the National League of Cities (NLC), a coalition representing 19,000 cities across the nation, launched the Municipal Action for Immigrant Integration (MAII), a new program aimed at assisting local officials in managing the challenges posed by immigrant integration. The two main components of the program are city-level naturalization campaigns and citizenship community initiatives to help local officials develop tailored action plans for immigrant integration. In Littleton, CO, the NLC collaborated with city officials to implement an Immigrant Integration Initiative. In May 2009, this initiative won a $50,000 “E Pluribus Unum” award offered by the National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy, managed by the Migration Policy Institute, in recognition of its success.10

In addition to demographic city profiles, local political orientations might also behave as important predictors for immigrant integration policies. A recent study shows that municipalities with Republican governments are twice as likely as non-Republican ones to propose restrictionist policies for immigrants and one-fourth as likely to propose pro-immigrant policies.11 However, there is variation within states, and we also found cities with Democratic governments adopting anti-immigrant ordinances. For instance, in the northern suburb of Waukegan, a city just 40 miles from Chicago, the city council passed an ordinance in 2003 setting a $500 fine for driving without a license or insurance and a $175 towing fee. The ordinance caused disproportionate harm to undocumented immigrants, who, if they lack valid Social Security numbers, cannot have driver’s licenses under Illinois law.

The ordinance drew protests from immigrant advocates in the community and from some neighboring cities. In 2009, Waukegan’s Democratic mayor lost reelection in part due to the unprecedented turnout of the Latino community, which was motivated to punish him for perceived anti-immigrant policies under his watch. According to an analysis conducted by ICIRR, in the ten Waukegan precincts with the highest percentage of Latino voters, those who voted for the incumbent mayor fell from 70 percent four years prior to 37 percent.12 This is not an isolated case. Elsewhere, the notoriously anti-immigration mayor of Hazelton, Lou Barletta (R), failed in his bid to unseat long-time Democrat, Paul Kanjorski (D), in Pennsylvania’s 11th Congressional District, after his city passed an ordinance seeking to punish employers who give jobs to undocumented immigrants, as well as landlords who rent to them. The city was sued by the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund and a federal district court struck down the ordinance with a significant cost to the city in legal fees. In general, it seems that regardless of political party, anti-immigration policies are not always an ironclad guarantee for electoral victories.

In cities with integrationist policies, we observed the greater involvement of immigrant organizations in several issues related to immigrant integration policies. This is the case for Chicago, a city with positive legislation protecting immigrants, including an ordinance that prevents police and other city employees from asking questions related to immigration status. This ordinance was approved just two weeks after the first massive protest of March 10, 2006 drew thousands of immigrants to downtown to protest the Sensenbrenner bill (HR 4437).

The city of San Jose also has innovative policies to integrate immigrants, including
CONTEXT MATTERS: Latino Immigrant Civic Engagement in Nine U.S. Cities

Latino Immigrant Civic Engagement in Nine U.S. Cities

a cultural proficiency initiative initiated by the Santa Clara County Office of Human Relations. Since 1996, the county has offered immigrant integration services, including free citizenship days, educational programs, and a cultural proficiency initiative. In 2008, the free citizenship day was offered in nine different languages, including Spanish. According to the office’s interim director, Teresa Castellanos, they began offering a loan program using funds from local private foundations to cover the citizenship application costs for eligible low-income permanent residents after they observed a drop in applications when naturalization fees increased.

In contrast, in the city of Charlotte, the 287g federal law enforcement program created a very hostile climate for immigrants. In this city, the immigrant community has been improving its negotiating capacity with local authorities. Strong advocacy from community-based organizations has increased their visibility and risen awareness among state legislators about the importance of sponsoring frequent citizenship days as a successful road towards civic engagement and political participation.

In North Carolina, Latinos represented only 3 percent of the electorate in 2008, but their voter registration rates increased by 174 percent between 2004 and 2008. In 2009, Helping Empower Local People (HELP), a leading immigrant advocacy organization in the area and a member of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), organized a meeting of four-hundred Latino leaders to ratify a multi-issue agenda to focus on healthcare access, education, driver’s licenses for undocumented immigrants, reform of the 287g law enforcement program, and to pursue comprehensive immigration reform.

There are no special recipes that Latino-led immigrant organizations can follow to attract attention from governments and produce positive outcomes for immigrant integration policies. However, there are a few emerging trends visible in all cases with successful integration plans sponsored by state and local governments:

- Latino organizations build strong coalitions among diverse ethnic immigrant groups
- Strong local ethnic media advocate for immigrant rights and disseminate key public information
- Labor organizations sponsor and support immigrant integration programs
- Latino and multi-ethnic organizations and coalitions engage with multi-issue agendas beyond comprehensive immigration reform
- Ethnically diverse inter-faith organizations join immigrant coalitions at the local level.

The road towards increased immigrant integration through local and state government faces many obstacles. In addition, naturalization costs continue to rise, affecting Latino immigrants disproportionately due to their lower average income levels compared to non-Latino immigrants. Demand for English-language instruction is higher than slots available nationally, and waiting lists are long despite government-sponsored initiatives. For example, the state of Illinois has allocated $300,000 to expand English classes compared with the $15 million recommended by the We Want to Learn English Initiative approved by the Illinois state Senate in 2007. The number of available seats to study English as a second
language in Illinois has actually dropped 20 percent since 2002, in spite of the state’s New Americans Initiative.\textsuperscript{17}

In the midst of an economic recession, state and local governments need to reorient their priorities for budget planning and spending. Faced with difficult economic scenarios, it might be tempting to delay investments in immigrant integration. However, governments need to understand that without access to full citizenship rights, foreign-born residents from Latin America and elsewhere will be less likely to be civically engaged within their new societies and will not achieve their fullest potential as workers, taxpayers, parents, and socially contributing citizens.

**FIGURES AND TABLES**

*Figure 1: State Legislation Related to Immigrants and Immigration, 2005-2009*

Source: Author’s elaboration using data from the National Conference of State Legislatures, Immigrant Policy Project, Reports from 2004-2009. (*Includes only legislation submitted and enacted in the first half of the year). Reports are available at http://www.ncsl.org
Figure 2: Number of Immigration-Related State Laws Introduced by Typology, 2007

Source: Adapted from *State Responses to Immigration: A Database of All State Legislation*. Migration Policy Institute and New York University School of Law, 2007. Available at: www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/statelaws.cfm. For an explanation of the typology and examples of bills represented in each category, please refer to the methodology section of the database.

Table 1: Immigration-related ordinances proposed and passed at the municipal level as of July 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF ORDINANCE</th>
<th>STATUS OF ORDINANCE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL</th>
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<td><strong>0.3%</strong></td>
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<td>PASSED</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
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<td>FAILED / TABLED</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,448</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES

1 A complete list categorizing immigration policies by states can be found at “The Anti-Immigrant Movement that Failed,” a report by the Progressive States Network, published September 2008 and available at http://www.progressivestates.org/.

2 It is likely that this is the reason there are fewer immigrant-led organizations in Tucson, and those that exist devote all their time and resources to defending immigrant rights at the border and fighting punitive policies, leaving little time for grassroots organizing for other issues.

3 For a comprehensive analysis of state laws related to immigration, visit the National Conference of State Legislatures’ Immigrant Policy Project. They have compiled detailed statistics on laws related to immigrants and immigration since 2005, which are available at www.ncsl.org.


7 For detailed information on local government integration policies in the DC metropolitan area and the demographic trends of the foreign-born population, see Report 2 in this series, Kate Brick, Michael Jones-Correa, and Audrey Singer, Local Goes National: Challenges and Opportunities for Latino Immigrants in the Nation’s Capital, Reports on Latino Immigrant Civic Engagement, No. 2, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2009).

8 However, some recent studies have found that local partisanship also plays an important role in determining local policies towards undocumented immigrants. For example, see S. Karthick Ramakrishnan and Tom (Tak) Wong, “Immigration Policies Go Local: The Varying Responses of Local Governments to Low-Skilled and Undocumented Immigration,” (paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, February 21, 2008).

9 For a comprehensive analysis of immigration-related local housing ordinances, see Jill Esbenshade et. al., “Division and Dislocation: Regulating Immigration through Local Housing Ordinances,” (CITY Immigration Policy Center, 2007).

10 To learn more about the Littleton, CO, Immigrant Integration Initiative, visit http://www.connectingimmigrants.org/ For more on NLC programs, see their web page at www.nlc.org/mai.aspx.


However, other legislation enabled the Illinois Community College Board to spend up to $15 million on the We Want to Learn English Initiative.

One important actor that has become increasingly involved in the promotion of Latino immigrant integration is the Spanish-language media. The role played by radio disc jockeys in mobilizing millions of immigrants to protest anti-immigrant legislation in 2006 exemplifies the importance of ethnic radio and print media in disseminating valuable public information to Spanish-dominant Latino immigrants.

In our study, we find that cities with a historically established Spanish-language media structure tend to have strong partnerships between these media and service and immigrant advocacy organizations in the joint promotion of civic engagement. In the last two years, the most strategic and successful media-sponsored program has perhaps been the *Ya Es Hora* citizenship campaign (“Now’s the Time!”), an innovative Spanish-language media campaign involving the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO), Univision Network, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), *La Opinión*, Impremedia, the National Council of La Raza, and several community-based organizations. Launched in Los Angeles in 2007, the campaign quickly extended to cities in Texas, Florida, and New York.

The communications strategy of *Ya Es Hora* (YEH) is based on its catchy slogan, which denotes a sense of urgency. Higher naturalization fees and increased immigration law enforcement across the nation placed low-income and mixed immigration status families in a very difficult situation. The constant threat of being arrested and placed in deportation proceedings for a minor violation increased the sense of risk among Latino legal permanent residents and encouraged many to pursue naturalization.

The campaign received support from community-based organizations in Los Angeles and elsewhere and many service organizations quickly joined by becoming citizenship centers. In the first year of operation, YEH managed to enroll 300 organizations, operating more than 400 citizenship centers and organizing 200 citizenship workshops. In addition, the campaign network distributed 100,000 naturalization guides advertising them through public service announcements in television, radio, and print media. In 2008, a second phase of the campaign was implemented to increase voter registration and electoral participation and the message was shifted to *Ya Es Hora: ¡Regístrate!* (Now’s the Time: Get Registered) and *Ya Es
**Hora: ¡Ve y Vota!** (Now’s the Time: Go and Vote).

*Ya Es Hora* is the most visible naturalization campaign created and implemented by non-governmental actors using Spanish-language and ethnic media as the main vehicles to reach out to Spanish-dominant Latino immigrants. It takes advantage of the vast Spanish-language network and solid structure of hundreds of community-based organizations with good track records as providers of citizenship services available in cities such as Los Angeles. However, in many cities and towns, Latino-led immigrant organizations did not have access to well-established Spanish-language media with solid track records as public service providers.

Among the cities studied in this project, for example, Las Vegas does not have many Spanish-language newspapers and radio stations and very few media outlets are Latino-owned. Established in 1980, *El Mundo* is the oldest Latino-owned newspaper, and it provides occasional community service announcements. During the 2007 presidential primaries, *El Mundo* and Spanish-language news radio station KRLV (1340 AM) offered their space to disseminate information about the caucus process. The radio program, “Miguel por la Mañana,” conducted weekly interviews with the members of Hispanics in Politics (HIP), and *El Mundo* ran weekly advertisements aimed at attracting Latino immigrant voters. Univision and Telemundo were very active in the caucus process, providing valuable information to viewers. The second-largest Spanish-language newspaper in Las Vegas is *El Tiempo*, and in 2007 it collaborated with the local Univision affiliate to offer a joint discussion segment between the newspaper editor and the news anchor about relevant local news. In August 2008, local Spanish-language media became quite visible during the presidential campaign when the Nevada Democratic Party selected Emilia Pablo Montaño, a Oaxaca-born Univision news producer, as its press secretary. Providing coverage of local, national, and international events, ethnic language media offer Spanish-dominant Latino immigrants opportunities to become aware of the current issues and debates that are affecting them in places of origin and destination.

Charlotte is a new destination city for many Latin American immigrants. There are few Spanish-language newspapers with a long trajectory, but market share competition and an increasing demand for news in Spanish have resulted in more publications. The majority of Spanish-language newspapers are owned by Latino immigrants in Charlotte. The oldest is *El Progreso Hispano*, a biweekly newspaper established in 1993 by an Ecuadorian immigrant that keeps a permanent online section on the citizenship exam. Here, the readers find a complete question-and-answer guide for the naturalization exam in English and Spanish. *Mi Gente, Qué Pasa*, and *La Noticia* are among the newer publications and some also offer a commitment to contribute with immigrant integration. For example, *La Noticia* was established in 1997 and quickly became the largest Spanish-language paper anywhere between Washington, DC, and Atlanta, GA, with an estimated 90,000 readers per week. Its mission is to provide readers with news about their new home and serve as a “bridge of communication between them and the community at large.” It offers news in several formats: Internet, radio, print, and two magazines, including one on Latino parenting. The paper also has a charitable foundation offering small scholarships to low-income Latino students interested in going to college. *La Gente* is one of the newest media and it also has a community-service component. Established in 2002, this newspaper...
prints frequent public service announcements encouraging people to participate in immigration reform through phone, e-mail, and letter campaigns to their local, state, and federal representatives.

Spanish-language media have the potential to become one of the most important actors in immigrant integration. Ownership issues sometimes limit the spaces a newspaper can devote to public announcements or to encourage Spanish-dominant immigrants to become civically engaged in their new communities. However, in some of the cities included in the study, it seems that many Latino immigrant entrepreneurs are choosing to follow innovative practices in the ethnic media business to contribute to the civic and political incorporation of Spanish-speaking residents in many communities across the nation.

**NOTES**


3. La Noticia’s full mission is available at www.lanoticia.com/Pages_E/aboutus.htm
Faith and religiosity are important values in Latino immigrant lives, and religious institutions consistently play a key role in the immigrant integration process. Foreign and U.S.-born Latinos share a deep religious commitment shown through high levels of church attendance and volunteerism. For instance, in an analysis of the 2004 National Survey of Latinos, researchers found that churches were the largest single recipient of Latinos’ volunteer time, thus playing “a critical role in creating social resources and community bonding … [they] provide a place in which Latinos/as make social connections, gain skills, and receive encouragement to become involved in other sectors of their communities.”

According to survey data, regardless of nativity, Latinos who volunteer regularly in church-related activities are significantly more likely to volunteer at non-church activities. Therefore, for Latinos, participating actively in a church is correlated to civic engagement in different spaces, such as school or tutoring programs, neighborhood organizations, business or community groups, and ethnic organizations.

However, when observing rates of Latino engagement in street protests across religious denominations, place of birth matters. According to a Pew Research Center phone survey conducted in late 2006, foreign-born Catholic Latinos were almost twice as likely to say they participated in a protest or demonstration, compared with their native-born counterparts (31 percent versus 16 percent). This survey also finds that “regardless of religious tradition, foreign-born Latinos indicate they participated at higher rates compared with the native-born. Among foreign-born evangelicals, for example, almost one-in-four (24%) say they participated, compared with 13% among the native-born.”

To partially explain this trend, it is important to remember that Latin American immigrants come from countries with a long tradition of mass protests and mobilizations for different social justice agendas, including peasant rights, electoral rights, and religious freedom, among others. For instance, in 2006, the spring immigrant marches preceded a massive popular mobilization in Mexico protesting the results of the presidential elections. In fact, in late summer 2006, Mexican leaders of the broad coalition demanding a recount in the presidential election toured the United States visiting several Mexican migrant organizations seeking solidarity with their pledge.
Regardless of religious affiliation or nativity, being active in a religious congregation seems to encourage further civic engagement among Latinos. In our study, we also found several overlaps among immigrant participation in churches and other areas of civic engagement. Institutional church commitment to provide culturally appropriate services and support to Latino immigrants varies across cities and religions. Church support for promoting Latino immigrant incorporation at the local level sometimes depends on the capacity of migrant-led community organizations to make those demands to church leaders or on the maturity of churches’ organizational structures for reaching out to immigrant groups and building pro-immigrant ecumenical alliances and coalitions.

In the case of Las Vegas, the level of support offered by evangelical congregations to Mexican, Guatemalan, and Salvadoran immigrants is due in part to the engagement of some pastors in the affairs of the communities of origin of members of their congregations, as well as in their new communities of residence. For example, Iglesia Amistad Cristiana is an evangelical congregation whose presence in the Mexican state of Hidalgo dates back to 1962. Amistad Cristiana now has 128 branches, including five in Nevada and California. Its first congregation in the United States began in 1978 in Las Vegas and the current pastor now offers Mass in the indigenous Otomi language. Each of their five Sunday masses attracts about 200 participants, mostly indigenous people from the state of Hidalgo. This pastor has been active in helping day laborers from his congregation to defend their worker rights, advising them about labor laws, and referring them to labor organizations, among other activities. In July 2009, in collaboration with the “Sí Se Puede” Latino Democratic Caucus, a free health fair was offered for the community at this church. In our interviews with Latino immigrants actively engaged with their churches, we commonly found that they were simultaneously engaged in volunteer work in their new congregations, as well as in churches from communities of origin, while also contributing to hometown associations in Las Vegas.4

Another example of church involvement in immigrant integration is found in Charlotte. The level of commitment among different religions, denominations, and congregations varies a lot. However, because of the unifying work recently done by Helping Empower Local People (H.E.L.P.), an inter-racial and inter-faith community-based organization, many more congregations have become interested in supporting immigrant integration. In the city of Charlotte, membership in specific congregations helps define your ethnic identity, as well as your position within the city’s hierarchical power structure. Latino immigrants are the most recent newcomers to this thriving financial center, and Catholic and Protestant congregations have recently become more engaged with issues of immigrant rights.

In his experience working as community organizer for H.E.L.P. in Charlotte, Chris Bishop observes a great expansion of the Latino Catholic population in the local diocese, as well as active efforts by evangelical churches to initiate Latino ministries in the city.5 The services offered by mainline Protestant congregations to promote the integration of Latino immigrants have been so far largely limited to English-language classes and music lessons; however, evangelical Christian congregations are by far the most active in the Latino immigrant community. While Latino immigrants are largely affiliated to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte, at the parish level the Catholic Church does not seem to...
be playing a leading role in promoting the civic and political incorporation of Latino immigrants. At the national level, by contrast, the Catholic Church has shown great institutional support in favor of comprehensive immigration reform. Inspired by a pastoral letter about migration, issued jointly by the Catholic Bishops of Mexico and the United States in 2003, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops launched the Justice for Immigrants Campaign in 2005, a national strategy to promote immigrant integration across all dioceses. However, local support for the initiative has been uneven. In the case of Charlotte, there has been no coordination of efforts between the parishes and the local campaign coordinator assigned to promote this initiative. As a result, few parishes and congregations are actively engaged in immigration issues.

So far, the most successful implementation of the Justice for Immigrants Campaign at the local level has been displayed in Los Angeles, and it is quite possible that success there is directly correlated with the vast network of community organizations that already existed in the city before this initiative was launched. For Latino immigrants, support from priests is sometimes crucial to determine their decision to volunteer or engage in non-church-related activities. However, some immigrants mobilized in cities where widespread Catholic Church support was absent. This was the case in Las Vegas, Omaha, and Charlotte, where a fledging social infrastructure had slowly developed in the last decade.

Overall, Latino immigrants are actively engaged in their U.S. churches and this participation subsequently motivates them to become civically engaged in different local issues affecting their new communities of residence, sometimes creating ethnic faith-based advocacy organizations to promote immigrant integration. In the long term, Protestant and Catholic institutional commitment to support civic and political integration programs and strategies will be very important to keep Latino immigrant communities civically engaged in cities large and small.

NOTES


2 Ibid. p. 23


4 Binational cooperation among church leaders and migrants dates at least as far back as the time of the Cristero War (1926-1929). For an account of the support offered by Mexican migrants, exiles, and refugees in the United States to the supporters of the Cristeros, see Julia Young, *Mexican Emigration During the Cristero War, 1926-1929* (Ph.D. Dissertation in History, University of Chicago, 2009).


6 See http://www.justiceforimmigrants.org/

7 For a case study of the Journey of Hope Campaign in Los Angeles, see Luisa Heredia, “Welcoming the Stranger: The Catholic
8 For instance, the National Coalition of Latino Ministers and Christian Leaders (CONLAMIC), an organization based in Washington, DC, that claims to represent 20,000 evangelical churches, has organized a national campaign to boycott the 2010 Census, asking pastors to tell parishioners not to fill the census forms unless there is a legalization program for undocumented immigrants. For more information about this boycott, visit CONLAMIC webpage at http://www.conlamic.org.

In the last decade, organized labor attitudes towards immigrants have changed drastically. Before 2000, labor unions often saw immigrant workers as enemies, finding them responsible for depressing wages and breaking strikes. However, in early 2000, this attitude changed and the American labor movement decided to demand an end to employers' sanctions and an amnesty for undocumented immigrants. The labor movement has since experienced some structural transformations, but has kept a unified voice in favor of some form of legalization for undocumented workers already living in the country. In the last decade, some unions have devised special programs to help immigrant members become naturalized U.S. citizens and encourage voter registration and electoral participation among increased rosters of Latinos.

In the cities included in our study, we observed a positive correlation between unionization rates and organized labor involvement in immigrant integration programs. Latin American immigrants in Charlotte had the fewest labor organizations engaged in immigrant integration, while those living in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas had more opportunities to participate in unions and receive immigration-related services sponsored by traditional and non-traditional labor organizations. While unions still attract the largest segment of Latino immigrants, independent worker centers have also become an important organizing strategy for low-wage Latino immigrant workers. At the national level, Latinos represented 10.6 percent of the total union membership in 2008. In 2006, on average foreign-born Latinos in Los Angeles showed significantly lower union membership rates than native-born ones (9.7 percent vs. 18.5 percent) (see Figure 1), although this city has shown a considerably higher union density rate than the state of California and the country as a whole in the past two decades. The active involvement of unions and worker centers in Los Angeles has been instrumental in the creation of solid immigrant rights coalitions since the 1980s.

In the last decade, Latino immigrant organizations in Los Angeles, San Jose, Chicago, and Las Vegas have created important coalitions with traditional and non-traditional...
labor organizations to promote civic engagement among Latino members, regardless of immigration status. For instance, many labor organizations encourage both legal and undocumented members to participate in get-out-the-vote campaigns. For those members who qualify for U.S. citizenship, some unions sponsor citizenship workshops to help members become naturalized citizens. In Los Angeles, SEIU is a member organization of the “We are America Alliance” and of the “Ya Es Hora” campaign, while the Culinary Workers Union in Las Vegas provides free naturalization services, organizes bilingual workshops to explain the caucus process prior to an election, and encourages members to register to vote. The Culinary Workers Union, with 60,000 members, has 45-percent Latino membership, including foreign and native-born Latinos, and it played a central role in the Las Vegas march in 2006, as well as in the hotly contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary.

In the city of San Jose, SEIU Local 1877 has been quite visible in the last two decades due to its successful Justice for Janitors campaign to bring better wages for Latino immigrant workers in the area. In the late 1980s, it began to hire more Spanish-speaking Latino organizers and created important coalitions with churches, associations, local government officials, and pro-immigrant organizations. More recently, SEIU participated in the campaign to get driver’s licenses to undocumented workers in California and played an important role in the immigrant mobilization of 2006 as a founding member organization of the San Jose Immigrant Rights Coalition.

In Chicago, unions and independent worker centers participated in the March 10th Movement and frequently support Latino immigrants in important battles against abusive employers. Some specific cases are worth highlighting. The most visible case of union support to defend basic worker rights is exemplified by the now extinct Republic Windows and Doors factory, which attracted worldwide attention in 2008. When the owner attempted to fire all workers without offering severance pay, the workers discussed a strategy with their representatives at the United Electrical Workers Union (UE) and unanimously voted to occupy the factory in a case that brought headlines and support from President-elect Obama. The factory’s labor force was mostly immigrant, with 75 percent of workers representing several Latin American countries. However, for these workers this was not the first time they participated in a solidarity movement. Three years prior to the factory occupation, the workers negotiated permission from the management to march on May 1 to support immigrant rights in Chicago’s downtown. When faced with the important decision of whether to fight their unjust termination, the union backed the workers’ decision to occupy the factory.

In the weeks and months following the occupation, community support was steady and more than 1,000 people, including local immigrant activists, hometown associations, faith-based organizations, and Spanish-language media visited the workers. The workers eventually received severance pay and inspired many others to demand lawfully mandated severance packages in similar cases across the nation, as well as in Canada, Argentina, and Ireland.

Finally, the Chicago Restaurant Opportunities Center (ROC) is the latest addition to the list of community-based worker centers serving both foreign- and native-born workers in the city. Launched in the fall of 2008 as an affiliate of ROC United, the organization is locally represented by José Oliva, a Guatemalan immigrant with a long history of labor organizing among Latino immigrants in Chicago. Chicago-ROC
is devising strategies to increase Latino immigrant membership and for that purpose, it offers bilingual trainings in bartending and upscale dining workshops to help workers gain specific language skills to move towards higher-paying positions within the industry. In the first year, they have registered 230 new members. ROC’s model combines research and policy work with high-road restaurant worker organizing\(^{11}\). Besides educating workers about their rights and promoting workplace justice, ROC is advocating in favor of two pieces of legislation, the Healthy Families Act, which would provide restaurant workers with up to seven paid sick days per year; and an increase in the $2.13 federally mandated minimum wage for tipped workers. With support from ROC United, Chicago-ROC has commissioned a large sample survey of restaurant workers in the Chicago metro area and is currently disseminating its findings to the media and to local restaurant workers with the help of committed members and local advocacy organizations\(^{12}\).

As we have seen in the cases described in this section, in cities where labor organizations have clout, they provide crucial support for Latino immigrant civic engagement, as well as increased awareness of their rights as workers regardless of their immigration or citizenship status. Yet in cities where labor is either weak, or its base is primarily limited to non-Latino U.S. workers, such as Fresno, Tucson, or Charlotte, unions have not been major players in the immigrant civic participation process.
NOTES


2 Elizabeth O’Connor, SEIU, personal communication to Jonathan Fox, January 14, 2010.

3 For more on worker centers see Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of a Dream, (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2006).


8 For more details on this landmark case, see Kari Lydersen, Revolt on Goose Island. The Chicago Factory Takeover, and What it Says About the Economic Crisis, (New York: Melville House Publishing, 2009); and the forthcoming documentary, Workers’ Republic, by filmmaker Andrew Freund. A director’s cut of the documentary was screened in the fall of 2009 at Casa Michoacán as a fundraiser for the local chapter of the International Socialist Organization.

9 To learn more about Chicago ROC, visit http://www.rocunited.org/affiliates/chicago.

10 Prior to this position, José Oliva served as director of the onetime Latino Worker Center (now called Arise) at Chicago Inter-faith Worker Justice, an ecumenical national network established in 1996.

11 High-road labor organizing goes beyond unionization. It emphasizes low unemployment, living wages, job-training, investment in local businesses, and regional self-sufficiency among other short- and long-term goals.

12 Chicago ROC Advisory Board meeting, July 15, 2009.
CONTEXT MATTERS:
Latino Immigrant Civic Engagement in Nine U.S. Cities

The participation of Latino youth in the immigrant mobilizations of 2006 is a welcome addition to the list of actors who played a visible role in the success of the marches. In many cities across the nation, high school and college students joined the protests in solidarity with friends and families using different strategies to gain visibility as a group. For instance, high school students organized walkouts to protest the Sensenbrenner bill while others disseminated information about rallies and immigrant rights using the Internet and mobile devices. The hundreds of young Latinos involved consisted of U.S.-born citizens, permanent residents, foreign-born naturalized citizens, and unauthorized residents. They all shared the common goal of demanding dignity and respect for all immigrant workers.

In many of the cities included in our study, we found an emerging Latino youth organizing network led by both U.S.- and foreign-born immigrants. It is well-documented that low income and minority youth are less likely to engage in political and civic activities due, in part, to little encouragement in the public school system and the pressures of working to help their families with extra income. Yet, during the 2006 spring mobilization, documented and undocumented Latino immigrant youth took to the streets to exercise their right to protest, a highly civic act that offers lots of hope for the future of Latino political and civic engagement. In some cases the youth leaders emerging from the wave of protests did not have previous experience in community organizing, but had useful social networking skills.

To get their message across different schools and neighborhoods, they used MySpace, Facebook, voicemail, and mobile text messages to disseminate fundraising events, meeting points for attending marches, strategies to circumvent school attendance policies, and other relevant information. In contrast to the acts of disobedience displayed during the civil rights movement of the 1960s, Latino youth protests were remarkably orderly. Nonetheless, some students faced harsh disciplinary sanctions at school after walkouts.

In the case of Chicago, youth were overrepresented at the immigrant May Day marches in 2006 and 2007. According to a survey of marchers conducted by researchers at the University of Illinois, Chicago, more than half of respondents were young people, between 14 and 29 years old. Of those, over two-thirds were U.S. citizens. After the marches, some
local organizations supported the creation of new alternative spaces for Latino youth expression where they could decide their own social justice agendas and organizing priorities.

In the city of Chicago, El Zócalo Urbano and Batey Urbano are two examples of emerging Latino youth organizations with broad social justice agendas including immigrant rights, neighborhood preservation, and cultural expression. In 2006, some members of El Zócalo Urbano went to Mexico City and met with legislators and community leaders to obtain binational support for the May 1 economic boycott in an attempt to build cross-border alliances.

In late 2009, a broad coalition including high school and college youth united to stop the deportation of Rigo Padilla, a Mexican student attending the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC). They held organizing meetings to devise best strategies to fight for his case at Casa Michoacán, UIC, and Radio Arte, a Latino youth-led local radio station. With logistical and organizational support from the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (ICIRR), many students—both documented and undocumented—staged rallies in front of city hall, encouraged online petitions to the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency using Facebook, enlisted the support of local and national university professors, and expressed their support for the DREAM Act. The case was temporarily resolved on Human Rights Day (December 10) when ICE announced they would delay Rodrigo Padilla’s deportation for one year.

In Dallas, a city with a Latino foreign-born population estimated at more than a quarter-million in 2007, Latino high school students organized several walkouts in March 2006. According to The Dallas Morning News, on March 27, a group of 4,000 students walked out of high school, and the message was spread through postings on MySpace, e-mails, and text messages. Latino high school students sent messages inviting their peers to attend a large rally to protest anti-immigrant legislation at Kiest Park and at city hall. The high turnout of the student walkout became an inspiration leading to a massive demonstration in April with a crowd of 350,000, according to conservative estimates.

In San Jose, Latino youth joined the Immigrant Rights Coalition and the experience taught them valuable lessons and skills on social justice organizing. The experience of participating in massive protests to demand immigrant rights prompted some energetic Latino immigrant students to establish more formal organizations, such as Student Advocates for Higher Education (SAHE), a local group that emerged after the marches of 2006 to support undocumented high school and college students, bringing visibility to their cause and helping them overcome isolation and marginalization.

Due to difficulties faced when analyzing differences between documented and undocumented immigrant youth, the organizing strategies of the latter group were more challenging to map. Latino undocumented youth are a very vulnerable group in this country, one that faces the constant threat of deportation and is frequently uninterested in becoming visible in the public eye. The fledging coalition of student activists (the brand new Immigration Youth Justice League) is now trying to share its experience while learning new strategies from similar groups across the nation.

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local communities. However, despite the insurmountable challenges that undocumented Latino youth face to get ahead in American society, there are a few groups which have created safe spaces to increase their civic and political engagement. One important issue for these groups is defending their right to receive an education beyond high school and to obtain a path to legalization. Their visibility in the public square is still modest but thanks to clever strategic alliances and coalitions with pro-immigrant allies, undocumented youth have found some outlets for self-expression and self-representation and are steadily forming a new social movement.¹⁰

NOTES

1 Many cities across the United States experienced student walkouts during the 2006 immigrant demonstrations, including Las Vegas, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC.


4 Ibid.

5 For more on Zócalo Urbano and Batey Urbano, visit www.elzocalourbano.net and www.bateyurbano.org.


8 For more on the creation of this new coalition, see Antonio Olivo, “Chicago students step up debate on immigration reform,” The Chicago Tribune, online edition, January 18, 2010.


The issue of whether to regularize or expel the undocumented has long dominated the immigration debate. This sense of urgency on both sides is understandable, yet it has had the effect of “crowding out” the question of the status of the permanent resident population. Millions of permanent residents are eligible for citizenship, yet have not taken that step. In principle, one could imagine that both sides of the debate over the undocumented could be able to agree on the importance of encouraging full citizenship for those already eligible. Without question, they have “played by the rules,” yet they remain unrepresented, which challenges basic assumptions about a democratic society. Notably, critics of unauthorized immigration have yet to take up the cause of encouraging the full integration of legal immigrants, which undermines the credibility of their frequent claim that they are not opposed to immigration per se, but rather are primarily concerned about upholding the rule of law.

By 2005, citizenship rates for legal immigrants had reached their highest level in a quarter century, 52 percent. While Latin Americans historically had lower rates of naturalization than immigrants from other regions, for reasons that are still not well understood, their numbers increased sharply between 1995 and 2005. During this period, according to leading demographer Jeffrey Passel:1

• Among the major sending countries and regions, new citizens from Latin America grew the most in number, rising by nearly 2.4 million over the ten-year period.

• The nearly 1.6 million naturalized citizens from Mexico now outnumber those from any other single country; a decade earlier, the Philippines ranked first.

• The naturalized population from Mexico grew the most rapidly of any large country or region, 144 percent over the decade.

Many who had regularized their status during the amnesty promoted under the Reagan administration became eligible for citizenship during the 1990s. The gap between naturalization rates for Latin Americans and immigrants from other regions closed substantially between 1995 and 2005.

The conventional approach to analyzing variation in naturalization patterns focuses on differences across national origin. This ap-
proach suggests that differences in national political cultures are a key factor in explaining naturalization decisions. While citizenship decisions certainly are influenced by the political cultures that immigrants bring with them, their perception of access to the citizenship process may also be strongly influenced by their level of formal education. Indeed, the citizenship exam is a de facto literacy test. Command of the English language is also relevant, which in turn is influenced by social class and access to quality language instruction. Access to reliable legal support is also crucial for immigrants to trust that they can navigate the process successfully. Indeed, researchers know remarkably little about what factors determine applicant success rates. While there is official data on success rates in the citizenship test, these figures underestimate the overall non-completion rate, which is likely to be substantially higher.

The conventional emphasis on national origin as the key variable explaining citizenship decisions among permanent residents could be described as the “national political culture” approach. This approach involves an additional assumption, which is that the main determinant of citizenship decisions is the motivation of immigrants themselves. This approach assumes a highly voluntaristic “model” of naturalization decision-making, and does not account for the role of institutional barriers, such as limited access to affordable language instruction or reliable legal aid.

Motivations also interact with perceived barriers, which are especially relevant insofar as ethnographic research indicates that the naturalization examination process is perceived to be highly unpredictable, at least by Mexican immigrants. In contrast to the implied culturalist-voluntaristic approach, naturalization decisions can be understood as investments by immigrant families, involving substantial commitments of time, energy, money—as well as perceived risk. At the same time, another perceived barrier has been substantially lowered in recent years; since a Mexican constitutional reform in 1996, there has been a substantial softening of the once-dominant view that seeking U.S. citizenship was an act of disloyalty and would lead to a loss of rights in Mexico. Mexico’s official recognition of the legitimacy of dual nationality has made U.S. citizenship more attractive to those immigrants who want eventually to return.

An approach that focuses on the demographic or cultural characteristics of the immigrants themselves also leaves out the possibility of change over time. The post-2006 spike in citizenship suggests that immigrant motivations can indeed change quickly. The number of applications doubled during fiscal year 2007 (ending September 30), reaching 1.4 million petitions. How many of these applicants managed to complete the process in time to vote in 2008 is not yet clear, given the substantial backlog.

While immigrants certainly have varying motivations regarding the citizenship process, access to supportive institutions may turn out to be a key factor allowing those who are motivated to move forward. One of the most powerful indicators of the limitations of the “national political culture” approach is the fact that rates of naturalization among eligible Mexican permanent residents vary dramatically by state and county of residence in the U.S. Table 1 presents official data on the percentage of eligible Mexican permanent residents who had become citizens as of 2004 (limited to those who had become residents beginning in 1985). While Illinois and California showed rates of 31.3 percent and 27.9 percent, respectively, New Mexico only had a 16.5-percent citizenship rate, and only 20.4 percent of eli-
ble Mexicans, who had gained their residency in Texas, naturalized. The data show similar ranges of variation across counties within states. While San Francisco had a rate of 37.9 percent of citizenship among eligible Mexican-born permanent residents, and Los Angeles reported 33.6 percent, California’s Central Valley counties fell in the 15-to-17-percent range. This pattern of variation by a factor of two, both across and within states, for the same national origin group, appears to rule out the “national political culture” explanation and instead supports the proposition that “context matters” for explaining immigrant civic engagement decisions.

The numbers of new citizens rose sharply in 2008, reaching more than one million in just one year, as shown in Table 2. This 58-percent increase over 2007 reflects immigrant decisions made in 2006 and 2007, in a polarized environment of broad mobilization both for and against immigrant rights, and against the backdrop of sharply increased administrative fees and a new citizenship test. The 2007 and 2008 citizenship figures also show a remarkable increase in the Latin American share of those increased numbers of new citizens, rising from an approximately one-third share from 2002 to 2005 to reach 51 percent in 2008. This meant more than half a million new potential voters of Latin American origin in 2008. During this same period, the Mexican share of new citizens almost doubled, reaching 22 percent in 2008.

Table 1: Geographic variation in Mexican naturalization patterns, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>TOTAL MEXICAN LPRS 1985-1999</th>
<th>TOTAL NATURALIZED</th>
<th>TOTAL NOT NATURALIZED</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE NATURALIZED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARIZONA</td>
<td>115,118</td>
<td>23,692</td>
<td>91,426</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALIFORNIA</td>
<td>1,857,717</td>
<td>517,594</td>
<td>1,340,123</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLORADO</td>
<td>40,220</td>
<td>8,867</td>
<td>31,353</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLORIDA</td>
<td>74,356</td>
<td>12,844</td>
<td>61,512</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLINOIS</td>
<td>225,970</td>
<td>70,632</td>
<td>155,338</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEVADA</td>
<td>33,906</td>
<td>9,226</td>
<td>24,680</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW MEXICO</td>
<td>48,513</td>
<td>7,997</td>
<td>40,516</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>18,213</td>
<td>2,781</td>
<td>15,432</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXAS</td>
<td>715,119</td>
<td>146,212</td>
<td>568,907</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL IN THESE STATES</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,129,132</strong></td>
<td><strong>799,845</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,329,287</strong></td>
<td><strong>26%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mexican Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) by Selected States, Fiscal Year Granted LPR Status, from 1985 to 1999, and Naturalization Status by 2004
While the numbers of new citizens have been growing faster than the numbers of new permanent residents, a huge backlog of eligible immigrants persists. As Table 3 shows, official U.S. government estimates indicate that at least 2.7 million Mexico-born legal permanent residents had not yet become citizens as of 2007. This means that the almost one quarter of a million Mexican-origin immigrants who became new citizens in 2008 accounted for less than 10 percent of that year’s total pool of potential new citizens of Mexican origin. This suggests the need for a broad reassessment of the determinants of citizenship decisions. Those interested in promoting citizenship among permanent residents could use new research tools that could address not only motivations, but also perceived barriers in the naturalization process.

Again, context matters

How and why eligible permanent residents decide whether to engage in the citizenship process remains poorly understood. Yet the available evidence suggests that the context within which they make these decisions matters. How many permanent residents have access to sources of orientation that are both reliable and perceived as credible, to guide them through the process? For example, are public resources available to make English-language and civics classes available to low-income immigrants who want to learn? How far away are the classes located, how large are they, and how long is the waiting list? Are the citizenship tests demonstrably consistent, and are they perceived by immigrants as fair?

Table 2: Growing share of new citizens of Latin American origin, 2002-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL NEW U.S. CITIZENS</th>
<th>NEW U.S. CITIZENS OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN ORIGIN (%)</th>
<th>NEW U.S. CITIZENS OF MEXICAN ORIGIN (%)</th>
<th>TOTAL NEW U.S. CITIZENS OF MEXICAN ORIGIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>573,708</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>76,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>463,204</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>56,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>573,151</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>63,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>604,280</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>77,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>702,589</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>83,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>660,477</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>122,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,046,539</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>231,815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The category of “New citizens of Latin American and Caribbean origin” was constructed by subtracting the Canadian new citizens from the North American category, which also includes Caribbean, Central American, and Mexican immigrants, and then adding them to the South American category.

At least for the past decade, the federal government has taken a laissez faire approach, both to immigrant integration in general and to the promotion of citizenship in particular. Few state governments have tried to fill the gap. With the exception of modest federal spending on adult education, the integration-related costs of civic education, cross-cultural communication, learning English, and legal aid have been borne either by the immigrants themselves or by private institutions and local governments. As Murguia and Muñoz put it:

Perhaps the most extraordinary thing about the integration of immigrants in this nation of immigrants is just how much it is being done by the immigrants themselves, with a minimum of effort by government or society at large. Despite widespread hand-wringing that today’s immigrants are not learning English or becoming “like us” as they used to, the traditional indicators—English-language acquisition, workforce participation, homeownership, military service, civic participation, and intermarriage—make it clear that immigrants continue to do what they have always done: become Americans relatively quickly. We’re getting an enormous return on a tiny investment.¹⁴

In contrast, in the years immediately following the 1986 immigration reform, the federal government made a $4 billion investment in immigrant integration.¹⁵ These funds encouraged a wide range of partnerships between state and local governments and non-profit organizations that engaged with diverse immigrant communities. The substantial increase

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Table 3: The persistent stock of citizenship-eligible legal permanent residents (LPRs), 2002-2007⁵³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL ESTIMATED NUMBER OF CITIZENSHIP-ELIGIBLE LPRS</th>
<th>TOTAL ESTIMATED NUMBER OF MEXICO-BORN CITIZENSHIP-ELIGIBLE LPRS</th>
<th>ELIGIBLE MEXICAN LPRS AMONG ALL ELIGIBLE LPRS (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7,840,000</td>
<td>2,364,000</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>7,900,000</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Official data not available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>8,250,000</td>
<td>2,650,000</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8,150,000</td>
<td>2,750,000</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Official data not available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Official estimates of the numbers of Latin American LPRs eligible for citizenship are not available. Source: Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security. For a detailed citation, see note 13.
in citizenship for the IRCA generation, combined with steady increases in voter turnout and other indicators of civic engagement, all suggest that this investment subsequently paid off. The prospects for closing the gap between eligible legal residents and new citizens in the future will depend heavily on whether or not the federal government makes immigrant integration a policy priority in the future.

NOTES


3 This proposition is based on the experience of the Citizenship Project in California’s Monterey County in the 1990s, which revealed the substantial share of applicants who did not get as far as the test, even with some degree of institutional support from the project (personal communication, Paul Johnston, former director, Citizenship Project, September 24, 2009).

4 There is a basis for the perception that naturalization processes can put residents’ legal status at risk. See Julia Preston, “Perfectly Legal Immigrants, Until They Applied for Citizenship,” The New York Times, April 12, 2008, A1.

5 See Adrián Félix, “New Americans or Diasporic Nationalists?: Mexican Migrant Responses to Naturalization and Implications for Political Participation,” American Quarterly, Volume 60, No. 3, September 2008, pp. 601-624. His extensive participant-observation in southern California citizenship classes in 2006-2007 found that following the marches they had become “alternative public spaces,” within which citizenship decisions became a form of collective action, where “the solidarity and synergy of the classroom counteract and perhaps trump the negative emotions that have long discouraged the process among Mexican immigrants.” See Felix, 611.

6 Note that the Mexican government’s recent flexible stance towards those who become U.S. citizens does not extend to residents of Mexico who become Mexican citizens. The required oath requires that new citizens state that they “renounce their nationality of origin… to take on, with full responsibility, the rights and obligations that come with Mexican nationality.” See Rosa Elvira Vargas, “Demandan ONG a Fox derogue el TLC con la Unión Europea,” La Jornada (Mexico City), March 1, 2005, 3.


8 Because of this huge regional lag in political representation of legal immigrants, statewide politics in California is sharply biased by the persistent minority rule in the Central Valley.

9 More precise analysis of citizenship trends is limited by the puzzling fact that little relevant data is made public by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. More public access to data on citizenship trends would help public and private agencies concerned with immigrant integration to target their efforts more effectively. In the case of this study, access to national origin citizenship data, disaggregated by state and county, was made possible once at the discretion of a generous government statistician. However, the official data discussed here does not extend beyond 2004 because this openness was not subsequently repeated.

The impacts of the new citizenship test are not yet clearly understood. For background, see a corresponding report by the Migration Policy Institute. Migration Policy Institute, “High Stakes, More Meaning: An Overview of the Process of Redesigning the US Citizenship Test,” *Immigration Backgrounder*, no. 6, (September 2008), http://www.migrationinformation.org/integration/.


The protest marches of 2006 played an important role in building alliances among Latino immigrants and other traditional elements of U.S. civil society, including established Latino organizations, immigrant advocacy networks, labor unions, business associations, and political leaders. While some predicted that massive waves of protest would continue, recent marches have tended to be much smaller. But if 2006 was a watershed for protest, it appears that it also served as a catalyst for higher naturalization rates (see previous chapter) and greater political activism. The popular chant in the 2006 marches, “today we march, tomorrow we vote,” appears, in good measure, to have come true.

It is hard to measure accurately the degree to which the marches themselves—and the broader debate on immigration law—have spurred political activism, but there is little doubt that this has increased dramatically over the past decade and at an especially rapid rate in the past four years. Latino voting registration surged 24.7 percent from the 2004 to the 2008

**Table 1: Racial and Ethnic Composition of Voters, 1992-2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WHITE (NON-HISPANIC)</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLACK</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISPANIC</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIAN</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

presidential election and voting rose 28.3 per-
cent.¹ Over the twelve-year period from 1996
to 2008, Latinos went from being 4.7 percent
of the electorate in presidential elections to 7.4
percent, and almost a tenth of those eligible to
to vote (see Table 1).² This rise in Latino voting
was largely, though not exclusively, driven by
the rise in immigrant voters.

In some states, the importance of the Latino
vote has become particularly noticeable. New
Mexico, Texas, California, and Florida lead
the nation in registered Latino voters, with 15
to 36 percent of the population in each state
(Table 2). However, in the 2008 elections,
perhaps the greatest impact of Latino voting
was in states with smaller Latino populations
but more divided electorates. It was in states
like Nevada, North Carolina, New Mexico,
New Jersey, Virginia, and even Indiana where
President Barack Obama’s ability to get out
the vote among Latino voters may well have
helped secure a small margin of victory.³ He
enjoyed a particularly enthusiastic following
among Latino voters under the age of 30, 76
percent of whom voted for Obama (compared
to 54 percent and 95 percent among white and
African-American voters under the age of 30,
respectively).⁴ Similarly, President George W.
Bush’s ability to remain competitive among
Latino voters in several states in 2004 may well
have helped him win that election. This weight
of Latino voters is likely to increase even more
in the next national elections in 2012 and have
an impact on the future composition of the
U.S. Congress.⁵

There has also been a significant rise
in Latino elected officials throughout the
United States. According to statistics from the
National Association of Latino Elected and
Appointed Officials, the number of Latino

Table 2: States with Highest Percentage of Registered Latino Voters, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEW MEXICO</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEXAS</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALIFORNIA</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLORIDA</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARIZONA</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEVADA</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW YORK</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW JERSEY</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLORADO</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILLINOIS</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

elected officials has jumped 37 percent from 1996 to 2007. There have been particularly dramatic increases—of around fifty percent—among state legislators and school board officials (see Table 3).

The importance of Latino immigrant political influence has been especially noticeable in some of the cities addressed in this study. Both Los Angeles and Chicago, for example, have a significant number of immigrant Latino leaders in elected and appointed positions of authority. Both cities are historical immigrant gateways. In Chicago the history of immigrant-based coalition politics undoubtedly has helped Latino immigrants move more quickly into the political process than other cities with fewer linkages between immigrant communities and political parties. The long history of Mexican-American political influence in Los Angeles has also helped Latin American immigrants move into the political process.

Both Los Angeles and Chicago have seen successful recent campaigns for voter registration organized by immigrant-led and Latino organizations. Perhaps the most significant campaign in its scope was the Los Angeles-based (though eventually national) “Ya Es Hora” campaign organized by media and advocacy organizations. Chicago’s New Americans Initiative, organized by the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, similarly encouraged thousands of Latino immigrants to register to vote.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVEL OF OFFICE</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>CHANGE (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FEDERAL</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATEWIDE OFFICIALS (INCLUDING GOVERNOR)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE LEGISLATORS</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTY OFFICIALS</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUNICIPAL OFFICIALS</td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUDICIAL/LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCHOOL BOARD/EDUCATION OFFICIALS</td>
<td>1,240</td>
<td>1,847</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL DISTRICT OFFICIALS</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>3,743</td>
<td>5,129</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Latino Elected Officials by Level of Office: 1996 and 2007

In Las Vegas, Latino immigrants have benefited from the relative fluidity of political coalition-building in what is a relatively recent and dramatically expanding city. Unions in Las Vegas have provided a critical link to politics for many immigrant citizens. There are currently two Latino state legislators who represent mostly Latino immigrant neighborhoods, and one is actually a Mexican immigrant who received much of his initial support from immigrant-led organizations in the city.

In Washington, DC, in contrast, Latino immigrants are far more dispersed but have taken advantage of the region’s diversity to build coalitions with other groups. Two state legislators in Maryland and a county board member (and former board chairman) in Arlington, VA, are Salvadoran immigrants. All have won election by building coalitions that go far beyond Latino voters and incorporate other immigrant groups as well as African-American and white voters in their districts. It is noticeable, however, that Latino immigrants have had greater success in Maryland than in Virginia and Washington, DC, largely, it appears because one of the political parties has explicitly reached out to the growing Latino immigrant community in Maryland while there has been less direct attempt to incorporate this new political force in the other two jurisdictions.

Despite these advances, Latino immigrant leaders across the country reflect frustration at the lack of political weight that matches the size and importance of the community itself. This frustration is particularly evident in cities where Latino immigration is relatively more recent, such as Charlotte and Omaha, where political leaders have been slow to respond to the needs of immigrant communities. In some cities, such as Tucson, the weight of anti-immigrant political forces appears even to outweigh the emerging influence of Latino immigrant groups. Even in areas of substantial historical immigration from Mexico, such as Fresno and San Jose, it has not always been easy for Latino immigrants to gain a significant foothold in the political process.

However, this frustration is also evident in the cities where there is a long history of Latino immigration and where some progress has been made, such as Las Vegas and the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. Immigrant leaders often point to the diversity of the Latino immigrant community which makes it hard to build durable coalitions among Latino voters. Others noted that the recent arrival of so many Latino immigrants means they are only starting to test their political influence, and the relative economic disadvantage of many marginalizes them from active political participation. Still others note that the lack of legal status for many Latino immigrants creates a barrier for full political inclusion and undermines the possibilities for greater political influence.

Indeed, while the weight of Latino voters is clearly increasing dramatically—and the marches in 2006 have undoubtedly helped spur many into greater political activism—the lack of legal status for so many Latino immigrants is likely to limit the potential for expanding this influence in the future. Unlike in past decades, when immigrants naturally progressed from civic to political participation and political parties actively sought to expand their bases by reaching out to new voting populations, a large proportion of Latino immigrants have no hope of becoming full participants in American society.

Unless there is some form of immigration reform legislation that includes provisions for legalization of status, there will continue to be a significant mismatch between the importance of Latinos in American society and their weight in politics. Without that, many of the
traditional mechanisms that allowed immigrants to integrate into American society as both civic and political actors will never work in the ways they did in the past.

NOTES


2 Ibid., p. 3.


This section contains summaries of the nine city reports that comprise the project. These cities are: Charlotte, NC; Chicago, IL; Fresno, CA; Las Vegas, NV; Los Angeles, CA; Omaha, NE; San Jose, CA; Tucson, AZ; and, Washington, D.C. The full city reports in both Spanish and English are available on the project website at: www.wilsoncenter.org/migrantparticipation.

Each synopsis focuses on three core issue areas that influence Latino immigrant civic engagement and political participation. These issue areas are: the local history and politics of immigration, the economic and other challenges that Latino immigrants face, and the role of institutions. The synopses also seek to unify the different cities in the study by examining the cross-cutting issues that intersect them. Among others, these include: 1) the role of local governments and institutions, including the media, labor unions, and faith-based organizations; 2) the context and location of immigrant settlement (urban vs. suburban vs. rural); 3) Latino immigrants and other ethnic groups; and, 4) local immigrant politics, including the prominence of Latino political leadership, the presence of hometown associations, and the local Latino community’s involvement in the 2006 collective mobilization.

**CHARLOTTE, NC**

Located in the Deep South, Charlotte is a compelling case study in Latino immigrant civic engagement. For most of its history, the city’s population has been made up of native-born African-Americans and whites, with limited international immigration for most of the twentieth century. Until recently this has meant little government experience integrating sizeable non-English-speaking populations, as well as lower demand for Latino immigrant social services as compared to other U.S. cities. Yet this changed between the 1990 and 2000 censuses when the Charlotte metropolitan area became one of the country’s fastest-growing in terms of both its Latino and foreign-born populations.

Charlotte represents a challenging location for Latino civic engagement and political participation. The spread of immigrants throughout the expansive suburban metropolitan area works against the concentration of a dense, center-city community. And the area’s relative per capita shortage of centers of service provision means the absence of sites capable of consolidating into loci for political activism and immigrant empowerment.
In the arena of local politics, pre-existing immigrant political networks still lack the capacity to be effective champions for new generations of immigrants. And, geographically, Charlotte also is at a political disadvantage, considering its distance from the centers of the national policy debate and from the state capital of Raleigh, nearly 200 miles away. Within the Latino community, groups representing immigrant interests can be divided by national origin, may be politically disinclined to join forces, and may lack the technical expertise necessary to make viable policy proposals. Still, such obstacles aren’t insurmountable, as Charlotte’s Latinos showed April 10, 2006, when they staged a 10,000-strong rally as part of the nationwide collective mobilization.

Given that Charlotte’s population has traditionally been composed of two main racial groups, the very recent arrival of large numbers of Latino settlers suggests a new demographic paradigm. Yet the prospect of large-scale Latino settlement touches off concerns among many non-Latinos who fear that cultural, linguistic, and other differences will upset the existing social fabric. In fact, Charlotte’s non-Latino residents, politicians, and institutions appear largely ambivalent on the level of welcome the city should afford settling immigrants, who typically are Mexican or Central American, less well-educated than the general population, lack English- and in some cases Spanish-language proficiency, and, for those over 25, are only half-likely to be high school graduates. Reflecting the city’s overall ambivalence, mainline Protestant churches, as well as the Catholic Church, have pursued service-oriented ministries, while avoiding a more proactive engagement that could perhaps be interpreted as a political statement.

In this context, what challenges exist for enhanced Latino immigrant civic engagement? The report, Charlotte: A Welcome Denied, identifies the need for deeper linkages and the building of common cause between African-American and Latino communities, as a bridge to advance both groups’ objectives. Additionally, the report stresses that though local elites have done much to integrate Latinos into the workforce, much less has been done to integrate them as political actors and constituencies. Yet, going forward, it is this kind of integration that is needed to make prosper not only Latinos but the greater community of Charlotte. At the same time, the report also notes that Latino immigrant organizations need to do more to make their voices properly heard in the halls of local government.

Chicago is a unique example of Latino immigrant civic engagement. The city’s long history of international immigration, its deep traditions of community organizing and political activism, and its location far from the southern border differentiate it in important ways from other cities. In the pro-immigrant mega-marches of 2006 and 2007, Chicago’s distinction shone. Its 2006 march was one of the country’s largest, drawing 300,000 mainly U.S. citizens and documented immigrants to protest HR 4437 and the criminalization of undocumented persons. The city’s 150,000-strong 2007 march was singular for its size; it was far and away the country’s largest mega-march, though it was less internationally diverse and comprised a majority of Mexican marchers (59 percent), while in the previous year’s march only a large plurality were Mexican (45 percent). In 2008, without the same kind of imminent legislative threat posed by the Sensenbrenner bill, ad-
vocacy groups nevertheless mustered 25,000 demonstrators by their count to rally against enforcement policies in a May 1 rally that was also the country’s largest that year.

As contributor Amalia Pallares underscores in this volume, in Chicago marching is important. In fact, it may be a more meaningful expression of citizenship here than in other cities, whose political and physical landscapes may work against regular and large-scale mobilization actions. Marching distinguishes Chicago and shows the effectiveness of the city’s immigrant advocacy infrastructure, as well as this infrastructure’s resistance to national-level demobilization attempts, even after the halting of the Sensenbrenner bill in 2006. Marching also fits within a tradition in Chicago of direct and public political engagement by both citizens and non-citizens. In fact 74 and 69 percent of marchers in 2006 and 2007, respectively, were U.S. citizens.

Marching and preparing to march represent forms of participative democracy and of “substantive citizenship” that are especially accessible to Chicago’s Latino immigrants, contributor Judith Boruchoff notes. Yet besides marching, the city offers other unique opportunities for immigrant civic engagement. It gives non-citizens the right to vote for and hold office on Local School Councils, elected bodies that allocate budgets and hire and fire principals, contributor Susan Gzesh points out.

Despite Chicago’s advantages—a sturdy advocacy infrastructure, avenues for civic engagement for non-formal citizens, and a rich history of immigration—Latino immigrants here still face challenges. Immigrants in the greater Chicago metropolitan area—the inner suburbs and peripheral “collar counties”—experience obstacles to integration that appear related to their physical distance from the center city and its more welcoming atmosphere. As more immigrant families have bypassed the traditional gateway city over the past two decades, tensions have sharpened between immigrants and predominantly white suburbanites, even if these residents may themselves be recent emigrants from the city or are the children or grandchildren of European immigrants.

As in other cities, differences among Latin American immigrants from diverse countries of origin may weaken the power of a cohesive Latino immigrant lobby. Additionally, there exists a continuing need to build common cause and engage more effectively with African-Americans and non-Latino immigrants, as contributors to this volume point out. Moreover, Chicago’s Latino immigrants face another hurdle: the frequent incompatibility of civic and humanitarian efforts undertaken locally with the enforcement priorities and mandates of federal authorities. The sanctuary case of Mexican immigrant Elvira Arellano is a notable example of this divergence.

Key institutions have shaped Latino immigrant civic engagement in Chicago. Significantly, the family has taken a central role, becoming a locus for pro-immigrant advocacy and activism. Through the strategies of popular mobilization, litigation, advocacy, and sanctuary, advocates have attempted to elevate the role and image of the family unit in the politicized immigration debate, underscoring the parent-child separation that is a consequence of enforcement efforts. Another institution, the local Democratic Party, has created new channels for Latino political participation, supporting some Latino candidates for office. However, local powerbrokers in the 1980s and 1990s also stood accused of co-opting Latino causes and opposing candidates viewed as threats to the establishment. The Catholic archdiocese, for its part, has for decades functioned as a default
support infrastructure for Latino immigrants in Chicago, much as it has for prior and continuing generations of Catholic immigrants from Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Collectively, the city’s Latino networks, alliances, and coalitions have influenced immigrant civic engagement and political participation. In recent years this infrastructure has been strengthened by the nationwide efforts of the Chicago-based National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Communities (NALACC) and by the growing involvement in local politics of the city’s predominantly Mexican hometown associations (HTAs)—as discussed in the introduction by NALACC Executive Director Oscar A. Chacón and separately by contributor Rebecca Vonderlack-Navarro. As Chacón notes, enforcement threats have forced Mexican and Central American HTAs to recalibrate political priorities away from community-of-origin concerns and toward greater engagement in local and national issues affecting immigrants. This shift has placed Chicago’s HTAs, as well as the communities of origin that are their partners in Latin America, “at the forefront of evolving patterns and practices of transnational civic engagement and political participation.”

FRESNO

Fresno County, CA, has been the site of long-term immigrant settlement and sojourn for generations, having received Asian, Latin American, and internal U.S. migrants as farm workers since the early twentieth century. With its population in 2008 almost half Latino, the county represents a compelling case study that shows the challenges and barriers that exist even in an area of large Latino settlement, whose immigrant-receiving traditions are entrenched, and where community-based efforts have continuously worked to forge broader representation in the local policy process.

Any discussion of contemporary efforts to advance immigrant political participation and civic engagement must take into account the region’s rich political history. Fresno is a birthplace for important Latino political movements in California. Mexican-American community-based organizations began to emerge in the late 1940s, and the Mexican American Political Association, a base of support for local Latino political candidates, was established there in 1960. Its first president, Edward Roybal, was later a U.S. congressman from Los Angeles. The Central Valley, of which Fresno is the largest city, has been the site of significant farm worker labor struggles for decades, witnessing the rise in 1962 of the United Farm Workers, led by César Chávez. In the 1970s, Latino politics were invigorated by the Chicano movement, which linked political action to the assertion of ethnic identity, and led to the formation of a radicalized cohort of Latino politicians and activists, whose legacy as an “Old Guard” continues to influence local politics.

Concurrently, the presence of more women in migrant cohorts starting in the 1970s created a new impetus for long-term settlement and for the acquisition of citizenship benefits for their children. In the 1980s implementation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which enabled the legalization of many undocumented persons, broadened the base of local Latino constituents. The large-scale in-migration to the area of indigenous Mexicans and the emergence of migrant leaders schooled in industrial labor organizing further transformed the area’s political landscape in the 1990s and beyond. More recently, immigrant politics have been reinvigorated by the 2006 immigrant rights marches, in protest of...
federal legislation that would criminalize undocumented persons, as well as by community responses against federal immigration raids in the Central Valley town of Mendota in 2007.

At 2008, the County of Fresno’s population was 48.2 percent Latino, 85.8 percent of which comprised individuals of Mexican origin—an overrepresentation characteristic of Latino communities throughout California and the Southwest. Yet this high proportion of Mexican-origin residents belies the county’s diversity, as well as the dynamism of recent trends of Mexican immigration to the Central Valley—marked by larger cohorts of non-native-Spanish-speaking migrants from Chiapas, Oaxaca, Michoacán, and elsewhere. In fact Fresno’s Latinos live in immigrant, native-born, and mixed-status households; comprise both seasonal farm workers and middle-class second- and third-generation Mexican-Americans; and include monolingual English, Spanish, and indigenous-language speakers, as well as bilingual and multilingual speakers. At the same time, the diversity of the population prompts questions on its unity as a community, as raised in the report, *Latino Immigrant Civic and Political Participation in Fresno and Madera, California.* Is the Mexican-origin community in Fresno in fact unified politically? If so, what are the binding forces? If not, what divides? Language? Ethnicity? Cultural and political history? Legal status? And to what extent are Latino politics distinct from immigrant politics? To what extent do second- and third-generation Mexican-Americans identify as Latinos?

Despite its sizeable Latino population and its status as a birthplace for Latino politics in California, Fresno faces perhaps more barriers to enhanced immigrant civic engagement and political participation than other California cities. Naturalization rates are low compared with other metropolitan areas, as is voter turnout. And linguistic, socioeconomic, and citizenship differences within the Mexican-origin population prevent common agreement on political goals, such as whether or not to support an immigrant guest worker program. Furthermore like other immigrants nationwide in “survival mode,” Fresno’s migrant population, consisting of large numbers of seasonal farm workers and undocumented persons, may not place political participation and civic engagement on the list of immediate priorities. For its part, local government is routinely faulted with taking insufficient steps to integrate immigrants, for allowing policy to be guided by agricultural interests, and for taking ambiguous stances on federal immigration enforcement actions.

**LAS VEGAS**

Las Vegas’ Latino population faces many of the same obstacles that impede the civic engagement and political participation of Latino immigrants nationwide. Economic hardship and educational and language barriers work against formal political participation, and there are no Latinos on either the city council or the Clark County board of commissioners. At the 2006 midterm—the most recent election for which such data are available—Latino turnout in the county was less than overall turnout at 39 percent versus 56 percent. However anecdotal reports suggest that the number of Latino registered voters has risen significantly in the intervening period, and that the Latino vote was decisive in winning Nevada for Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama in 2008.

Statewide, even though only a few Latinos hold high office, the number of Latino officeholders has remained steady over the most recent election cycles. At 2008, there were two Latinos in the state Assembly and one Latino senator in Nevada’s 63-seat legislature—same
as after the 2006 elections. Additionally, two Latinos have held the post of attorney general over a similar period. Sitting Attorney General Catherine Cortez Masto, a Democrat, was elected in 2006, following Republican Brian Sandoval, who was elected in 2002 and who left the post to become a federal district court judge in 2005.

If for a variety of reasons Latino voter turnout has historically lagged overall voter turnout, Latino labor force participation has been consistently high. In construction, food service, hospitality, and tourism, Latino immigrants predominate in the workforce and on union rolls, magnifying the population’s importance economically and politically. While economic pressures frequently are conceived unilaterally as barriers, the drive to advance economically can also be viewed as a catalyst for enhanced civic engagement, since it helps lay a prerequisite foundation of economic security. As noted by roundtable participants in the meeting that inspired this report, “(o)nce their economic security has been realized, immigrants feel that they are stakeholders in the community, leading to more interest in citizenship.”

Besides the typical obstacles confronting a population that is younger and poorer than the average, immigrants in Las Vegas face bureaucratic and procedural hurdles that are blamed with discouraging formal political participation. As discussed in the report, these barriers include long processing times for applicants and confusion over the naturalization process, including the fear that background checks and decades-old misdemeanor violations could trigger deportation proceedings. Such obstacles may be particularly underscored in Clark County where a large percentage of the Latino population—44 percent—is foreign-born and where demand for naturalization appears to be growing.

Among major institutions—faith-based organizations, universities, the media—labor unions have been important protagonists of enhanced immigrant political participation. Culinary Workers Union Local 226, representing restaurant, casino, and hotel workers, played a leading role in organizing a massive rally on May 1, 2006, as part of the nationwide collective mobilization. The rally drew to Las Vegas’ famed Strip thousands of immigrants, as well as non-immigrants, for an evening protest against the so-called “Sensenbrenner Bill,” federal draft legislation that would have criminalized the undocumented. In the months after the protest, organized labor and the Democratic Party, among other groups, sought to translate the march’s energy and enthusiasm into more conventional forms of political participation. Such efforts were credited with igniting interest in the Nevada caucus process, spurring new voter registrations for the 2008 general election, and, according to some, playing a decisive role in the state presidential vote.

**LOS ANGELES**

Los Angeles County is nearly majority Latino with almost three-quarters of this population of Mexican-origin, the West Coast capital of Spanish-language media, and headquarters to powerful national labor and advocacy groups. Originally part of Mexico, and for decades the site of long-term settlement by Latin American and Asian immigrants, it is home to religious, cultural, and civic institutions that have long served immigrant and ethnic communities. In recent decades, its service and relief infrastructures have been tested by political adversity, including the fight over Proposition 187 in the mid-1990s and by the Sensenbrenner bill in the mid-2000s, as well as by the increasing volume and diversity of Latin American in-
migration (from Central America, southern Mexico, and of persons whose birth language is not Spanish). Its mayor is Latino, and Latino officeholders are highly represented in local politics. Perhaps as a consequence, the city is characterized by a welcoming attitude toward immigrants and by a degree of accommodation of undocumented immigration, notwithstanding differences between immigrant leaders and Mexican-American elites. The largest city of a state that is a political and cultural trendsetter, Los Angeles plays a leading role in national debates on immigration politics and policy, and its models of immigrant civic engagement are replicated elsewhere.

Yet in spite of these advantages, Los Angeles’ immigrant population faces similar challenges as those experienced by communities elsewhere, even if these are inflected in a way that is uniquely Californian. Politically, the state is largely discounted electorally from national races and its gerrymandered congressional districts inhibit partisan competition, perhaps discouraging the formation of engaged constituents. Socioeconomically, the city’s immigrants struggle to lay the material foundations necessary for engagement in the political process, as well as to pay for its related costs, such as English-language classes, naturalization application fees, and legal expenses. The dispersal of settling immigrants into suburbia and away from the gateway city, moreover, dilutes the effectiveness of activist strategies designed to reach a concentrated urban core. And divisions between the Mexican-American establishment and immigrant leaders prevent optimal policy cohesion on issues that affect the Latino community at large. Yet to be sure, these challenges are not the same kind of setbacks encountered by immigrant communities in other areas of the country (e.g. housing ordinances, 287g enforcement), where large-scale settlement is a more recent phenomenon, local governments are unwelcoming, and effective Latino lobbies and networks are non-existent.

Key institutions—and coalitions of institutions—have played fundamental roles in shaping Latino immigrant civic engagement in L.A. In 2006, spurred by concerns over the deportation of legal permanent residents and by the criminalization of undocumented persons contained in HR 4437, the Ya Es Hora coalition assembled a diverse cross-section of Hispanic media (Univision, Entravision, ImpreMedia), labor unions (Service Employees International Union, SEIU), and national advocacy organizations (National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, NALEO; National Council of La Raza, NCLR). This coalition wanted to get out the vote (Ya Es Hora ¡Ve y Vota!), create new citizens (Ya Es Hora ¡Ciudadania!), and encourage participation in the decennial census (Ya Es Hora ¡Hazte Contar!). Ya Es Hora was successful as a social marketing “brand” because it married the power of over-the-air broadcast messaging, packaged primarily in news programming and time-synchronized among various affiliates to maximize impact, with on-the-ground grassroots activism. This successful strategy took advantage of Los Angeles’ existing advocacy and organizational infrastructures, whose capacities to engage new citizens had grown as a result of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), as well as a consequence of the mid-1990s anti-187 protest movement.

Besides the Spanish-language media, other institutions have played influential roles in citizenship and get-out-the-vote campaigns, and long-time activists point out that las cinco patitas (the five legs) of successful efforts also must involve organized labor, faith-based groups, community-based organizations, and immigrant federations. Interestingly, this insti-
tutional interplay in the formation of new citizens and voters is taking place at a time when the national identity of immigrants is more accommodating than ever before (the greater availability of dual citizenship and the accessibility of expatriate voting), when broader avenues exist for binational civic engagement (matching-funds programs for community-of-origin development; activism to halt the criminalization of undocumented people in the United States and to decriminalize illegal immigration in Mexico), and when technology enables almost unbroken contact between migrants and their hometowns. For Los Angeles’ Latino immigrants this new transnationalism means that migrants can have one foot here and one foot there, and that “you don’t have to stop being a Mexican to be an American.” For Los Angeles, understanding the transnational identity of its immigrants has become a prerequisite for designing successful projects of civic engagement.

OMAHA

Nebraska mirrors other Midwestern states that have experienced rapid Latino population growth since the 1990 Census. The state’s Latinos are younger than the general population and a sizeable percentage of Latino adults are not U.S. citizens. Over the past two census years, Latinos have made a notable impact in important sectors of the Nebraskan economy, as well as on the state’s demographics generally.

Latino workers account for nearly 70 percent of the state’s mainstay meatpacking industry, and, in Omaha, the enrollment of Latino schoolchildren has grown so much that whites are no longer a majority in the local school district. Moreover, analyses show that, if it were not for Latinos, many Nebraska towns would have become ghost towns in the 1990s. And, projections suggest that Latinos will drive the state’s population increase in the next decade so that by 2030, 15 percent of all Nebraskans will be Latinos, about equal to what is today the proportion of Latinos in the national population.

Many immigrants in Omaha—and Nebraska generally—face socioeconomic hardships familiar to immigrants in “survival mode” nationwide. They are underpaid and overworked in the dirtiest, least rewarding, and most physically dangerous jobs. Their advancement to higher-paying work with health insurance and retirement plans is limited because of inadequate English-language proficiency and educational attainment. Discrimination and, for many, the vagaries of legal status and of belonging inhibit not only occupational mobility but also personal freedom and engagement in the greater society. Politically, Latinos are underrepresented—as measured by the ratio of Latino officeholders to the proportion of Latinos in the general population—and the only Latinos holding elected positions in the state, as of this writing, were Mark Martinez, twice-elected to the Omaha public schools board, and Rebecca Valdez, who in 2008 won a seat on the state board of education. Neither is an immigrant.

Amid a growing immigrant population, Omaha’s advocacy organizations face the challenge of scaling up to meet new demand for service provision. Organizations now find themselves tasked with channeling impulses of civic engagement and political participation into non-formal yet substantive expression—important given that many immigrants are not U.S. citizens or, if they are U.S. citizens, may not be of voting age. The city’s 15,000-strong April 2006 march to protest HR 4437, as part of the nationwide collective mobilization, was a notable accomplishment. Yet the fragmen-
tation of the march coalition shortly afterward may indicate that a looming threat (the Sensenbrenner bill) was necessary to sustain it in the first place.

For recent Latino immigrants, challenges to enhanced civic engagement are inflected by the unique social, political, and historical context of Nebraska. A conservative state in the U.S. interior, Nebraska has what Lourdes Gouveia refers to as a “selective immigration history.” For the advocates of contemporary immigrants, this means convincing long-term residents that conceptions of “Americanness” are continuously evolving, as much today as they were a century ago when Czech, Irish, Polish, German, Lithuanian, and, to a lesser extent, Italian and Mexican forebears first arrived to work in the slaughterhouses. Additionally, the mindset that presupposes the criminality of “illegal immigrants” and that views irregular immigration as a strategy of invasion—rather than as the consequence of policy failures in sending and receiving countries—represents another obstacle that has found expression in local politics. In the meeting that inspired the report, The Omaha Site: Constructing Migrant Civil Society, participants criticized city ordinances that they said aimed to make life harsh for immigrants, adding that “hostile” laws had fed a climate of “fear.” Such sentiment against non-citizens has also manifested itself in legislation passed at the state level, and in 2009, the Nebraska state legislature enacted a bill mandating proof of legal presence in the United States as a condition for obtaining “public benefits.”

Since 2000 faith-based groups, organized labor, and advocacy organizations, in combination and separately, have attempted to “construct a migrant civil society” in Omaha. Forging a coalition between Asian and Latin American immigrants, labor unions succeeded in winning contracts and establishing collective bargaining rights at three meat-packing plants in 2006. Similarly, immigrant advocates, including traditional “assimilationist” mutual-aid groups and Chicano organizations, as well as general charities like the Salvation Army, have increased service capacities in line with rising demand. And the Catholic Church, the institution of first resort for generations of immigrants, has helped to catalyze the development of migrant civil society, functioning as an effective facilitator and convener among different stakeholders.

SAN JOSE

San Jose is arguably California’s most ethnically diverse large city. In 2008, only about 30 percent of the population was considered non-Hispanic white, and the city’s Vietnamese- and Indian-descent populations were the largest outside of their respective countries. The surrounding County of Santa Clara leads all California counties in the foreign-born percentage of its population—36.3 percent—higher even than Los Angeles’ 36.0 percent and San Francisco’s 35.8. In this decade, strong economic growth, fueled by Silicon Valley, pulled hundreds of thousands into the area, and more than 600,000 foreign-born persons are said to make Santa Clara County their home. San Jose is also linguistically diverse, and about half of county residents speak a language other than English in the home, such as Hindi, Vietnamese, Farsi, Chinese, and/or Tagalog, though Spanish is the most widely spoken language after English.

In response to this diversity, local government in San Jose has become a pioneer in promoting immigrant integration strategies. Across the gamut of policy—from public
health, to education, to citizenship—local services are delivered in ways considered culturally compatible for San Jose’s non-English-speaking communities. “Diversity is our strength,” says Teresa Castellanos, the interim director of the Santa Clara County Office of Human Relations. Just one example of this outreach is the county’s multilingual “Citizenship Initiative” program, run by Castellanos’ office, which since 1996 has assisted in the naturalization process more than 120,000 applicants from dozens of nationalities.

Pro-integration policies reflect local government sentiment in favor of immigrants. San Jose is widely known as a “sanctuary city” for immigrants. And in recent years the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors has publicly condemned HR 4437 (“Sensenbrenner Bill”), as well as the Minutemen as an anti-immigrant vigilante group. The board has also been proactive in its pro-immigrant stance, offering continued support to the “Citizenship Initiative” program and collaborating with a state-funded naturalization campaign, while endorsing the right of undocumented immigrants to apply for state driver’s licenses.

Besides local government, other institutions—and coalitions of institutions—have worked to further immigrant civic engagement and political participation. A clear example highlighting the collaboration of institutions was San Jose’s May 1, 2006, mega-march. Part of a synchronized effort in dozens of cities nationwide to show the clout of immigrant consumers and workers, the march drew demonstrators numbering between 100,000 and 330,000, representing by either count the largest civil mobilization in San Francisco Bay Area history. Joining forces to take the streets were ecumenical religious groups, community-based organizations, legal advocates, Chicano and Native American activists, labor unions, and university students, who formed a movement that, though comprising mainly Latinos, aspired to the diversity of the society that it came out of. Ethnic media, important shapers of the immigration debate, drove interest in the preceding weeks and transmitted important day-of messages. Organized youth, some waving U.S. flags, injected the mobilization with a hope and faith in participatory democracy; the presence of families reminded that a consequence of enforcement efforts frequently is the separation of parent and child.

Given such a context of welcome, what challenges do the county’s Latin American immigrants face in the exercise of citizenship? From outside the community, California’s cyclical public finances and recent budget crises lend uncertainty to the viability of those local integration and citizenship initiatives that require long-term state investment. At the federal level, legislative inaction, the absence of a coherent national policy on immigrant integration, and ambiguity on the government’s enforcement stance preclude more meaningful collaboration with state and local actors on integration and citizenship goals. From inside the community, racism and perceptions of discrimination, as well as the view that the United States is an imperial power in Latin America, may represent obstacles to greater engagement in local politics.

Locally, improved efforts are needed to bridge the “generation” gap with older residents, as well as to convince them that immigrants’ greater access to government services benefits everyone. At the same time, greater common cause is needed with non-Latin American immigrant groups, given that an estimated 50,000 undocumented Asian immigrants are county residents. Additionally, white progressives, notable for their condemnation of
the Central American wars of the 1980s, represent another natural partner but were largely absent from the May 1, 2006 rally.

TUCSON

As U.S. border enforcement measures have forced more undocumented immigrants to cross through the Arizona desert, the state has seen its immigrant population increase significantly. Especially since the mid-1990s, this trend has placed Arizona at the center of a heated debate on state immigration policy. And in the mid-2000s, voters passed unprecedented restrictions on non-citizens’ access to social services, even imposing penalties on government clerks for failure to report immigration violations. More recently, long-time Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio has continued to generate controversy, springing from charges of racial profiling, illegal sweeps, and overzealous enforcement of federal immigration law.

Reactive state policies may reflect the public’s susceptibility to quick-fix solutions, particularly in the face of perceived federal paralysis on the “problem” of unauthorized immigration. This sentiment surged in 2004 with the passage of Proposition 200, a voter ID law that also sought to deny public benefits broadly to unauthorized immigrants and their families. Approved by 56 percent of voters, the ballot initiative mandated that social services workers verify applicants’ legal status before the processing of benefit claims, yet its provisions went a punitive step further, requiring that clerks report any “violation of federal immigration law,” lest they face criminal charges.

Opponents say Prop. 200, along with the related employee/employer sanctions initiative Proposition 300, had a chilling effect on Latino immigrant civic engagement and political participation. A reaction to the unsubstantiated threat of voter fraud, Prop. 200 clearly telegraphed to non-citizens that they were feared as potential saboteurs of the democratic system. Moreover, immigrant rights advocates say the referendums unfairly changed “the rules in the middle of the game,” compounding the economic, educational, and vocational challenges that non-citizens and families already face. Opponents add that the referendums have hurt the state’s economy and not led to the fiscal efficiencies claimed by backers.

Yet even in the current political climate, advocates can point to what they say are advances. In the report, Arizona’s Legislative-Imposed Injunctions: Implications for Immigrant Civic and Political Participation, Anna Ochoa O’Leary notes that the threat of punitive social policy has reinvigorated service organizations, much as the fear over border vigilantism strengthened the local immigrant and human rights movements of the 1970s and 1980s. Legal aid and advocacy organi-
zations, such as Tucson’s Fundación México; churches, some of which were involved in the 1980s Sanctuary movement; and, the Spanish-language media have been inspired to reverse what critics call the chilling effect of Prop. 200. At the same time, opposition on economic grounds has been registered by many in the business community.

Similarly Sheriff Arpaio’s baldly provocative tactics have similarly inspired a “backlash to the backlash,” spurring acts of political protest by both immigrant and native-born Latinos, as well as by non-Latinos. In only the most recent mass demonstration against the perennially controversial sheriff, approximately 10,000 gathered in Phoenix on January 16, 2010 to protest racial profiling, illegal dragnets of Latino neighborhoods, and other immigration enforcement actions, allegedly conducted by the sheriff’s office and frequently against the wishes of local police chiefs. But the protest also represented a stand against social currents that, in a broader sense, malign Latino immigrant communities: the creeping criminalization of undocumented persons through use of the term “illegal alien,” the easy conflation of immigration with terrorism, and the increasingly matter-of-fact humiliation of detained persons—even the shackling of expectant mothers as they give birth—something Arpaio’s office was accused of in 2008 and that still lingers in the memories of many.

Yet even in this context, Ochoa O’Leary still notes another important advance: the emergence of six hometown associations (HTAs) in the Tucson area in 2008. These HTAs provide opportunities for enhanced civic engagement and political participation in both country of origin and country of residence. Their consolidation, Ochoa says, was enabled by the Mexican government’s Institute of Mexicans Abroad (Instituto de Mexicanos en el Exterior, IME), which seeks to sustain linkages between Mexican expatriate communities and the Mexican government and on which she sits as an advisory board member for Tucson. In her report, Ochoa O’Leary acknowledges the short-term challenges standing in the way of enhanced immigrant civic engagement and political participation, but she also takes an optimistic long view. She notes the still-untapped potential of immigrant and 1.5-generation youth—young persons with very tangible stakes in the immigration reform debate and who will soon be eligible to vote if they aren’t already.

WASHINGTON, DC

The Washington, DC, metropolitan area is a compelling case study in Latino immigrant integration. An emerging gateway, it has an eclectic and dynamic population of Latin American immigrants, characterized by a core Central American identity yet with no majority nationality, and, especially since the past census year, growing numbers of Mexicans. While the region’s vibrant center-city has been a traditional entry point, it is the area’s suburbs in Virginia and Maryland that today are experiencing the swiftest Latino population growth. Importantly, the metropolitan region is truly unique among all other U.S. metropolitan areas. It overlaps two states and the District of Columbia—each with its own unique history and politics of immigration—and it is home to the nation’s capital, a fact that acccents the relevance of local political mobilization. Individual Latinos in the Washington metropolitan area are also different from their counterparts elsewhere. They are more likely to be naturalized citizens, and both immigrant and non-immigrant Latinos are more likely to be voters than Latinos nationally. Additionally,
Washington-area Latinos obtain higher rates of workforce participation and homeowner-ship, as well as higher household income and educational attainment, than the national Latino average.29

Washington became home to a diverse population of Latin American immigrants most prominently after World War II.30 Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, the region became a site of long-term settlement for immigrants predominantly from South America and the Caribbean who came to work in the city’s embassies and international organizations. In the 1970s and 1980s, refugees fleeing from wars in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua grew this community, imparting a pronounced Central American identity that continues today. Over the past two decades, the area’s Latin America-born population has grown rapidly, rising 158 percent from 1990 to 2006 and outpacing the 28-percent growth of the general population over the same period. Recent trends include larger cohorts of Mexicans, whose numbers grew 21-fold over 1980 to 2006, and the newness of arrival for a large share of immigrants. According to Audrey Singer, as of 2006 34 percent of the area’s Latin American immigrant population had been in the United States since only 2000, with 65 percent having been in the United States since only the 1990s.

In recent years, the swiftest growth of the Latino population has taken place in those areas with the least experience in accommodating sudden Latino population growth: the outer suburbs. In Loudoun and Prince William counties in Virginia, the Latin America-born population rose 170.5 percent and 181.3 percent, respectively, over 2000-2006, compared against 30.6-percent growth for the entire Washington metropolitan area. Latino immigration to the suburbs can be explained by many of the same reasons that have driven general population growth in the suburbs: lower real estate prices, better schools, and more job opportunities.31

The radiation of Latino immigrants away from the center city and their direct settlement in the suburbs characterize a trend playing out nationwide, especially in so-called non-traditional receiving areas, such as in the South and Midwest. Yet the suburbanization of Latino immigration in Washington is particularly unique given that the area is home to an assortment of overlapping legal jurisdictions. The metropolitan region consists of twenty-two municipal and county jurisdictions, the District of Columbia, and two states, relatively liberal Maryland and relatively conservative Virginia. The distribution of Latinos across these entities implies a diversity of governmental approaches to immigrant integration. While Takoma Park, Md., is considered a “sanctuary city,” local politicians in some outer suburbs have supported efforts to deny social services and require proof of legal residence to obtain a driver’s license. Such local politics reflect the impulses that encourage or discourage immigrant integration at the ground level. Likewise such responses demonstrate the role of geographic context as an important determinant of civic engagement and political participation.

Local governments are one institution among many in Washington. Churches, labor unions, immigrant advocacy organizations, schools, hometown associations, and youth organizations have significantly shaped immigrants and non-immigrants as civic and political actors. Churches and other faith-based organizations are structures of first resort for the formation of immigrant social networks—a first step of civic engagement—and provide community, ministry, and education in practical knowledge
and skills, e.g. English-language instruction, job training, and citizenship classes. To varying degrees, churches have acted as rallying points for political activism, particularly in rejection of the legislative efforts to criminalize undocumented persons in 2006. And some church leaders have ventured support for local political causes, such as endorsing a slate of pro-immigrant candidates in a recent local election or promoting the construction of a county-funded day-labor center for immigrants.32

Labor unions represent another institution for enhanced political participation and civic engagement. The hierarchy and discipline of unions mirror political and partisan structures, enabling processes of leadership formation by members who may also begin to perceive of themselves more consciously as constituents. Additionally immigrant-led organizations provide channels for civic involvement and political action. Groups, such as the United Salvadoran Communities of the D.C. Metro Area and Mexicanos Sin Fronteras, are centers of community and practical-skills acquisition, yet some also go a step further, advocating against local attempts to deny social services to immigrants and providing forums for political debate on various issues.

The Washington metropolitan area offers many advantages for Latino immigrant integration and political participation. The area has a deepening immigrant-receiving tradition, a diverse Latin American population, and is at the epicenter of the national immigration policy debate, emphasizing the relevance of local mobilization. Importantly, Latino immigrants in the Washington metropolitan area are more likely to be U.S. citizens than Latino immigrants nationally—an important indicator for trends of formal political participation and electoral turnout.33

Yet despite such advantages, the region’s foreign- and native-born Latinos face many of the same challenges encountered by Latinos elsewhere. Parts of the metropolitan area are politically hostile toward immigrants, and Latinos lag the general population in many of the socioeconomic indicators considered prerequisite for optimal integration and political participation. Because of its eclectic mix and no majority nationality, the area’s Latino community historically has comprised a mosaic of nationalities, slowing the formation of a perhaps more collectively powerful pan-ethnic Latino constituency, although this may be changing. At the same time, many Latinos’ “newness” to the region, as well as to the country generally, would suggest a steep accommodation period prior to successful civic engagement and political participation.

NOTES


2 Between 1990 and 2000, North Carolina registered the highest rate of increase in Hispanic population of any state—from 76,726 to 378,963, or 394 percent. During the same period, the Hispanic population in Mecklenburg County, of which Charlotte is the county seat and largest city, rose from about 6,000 to almost 45,000—an increase of 620 percent. Deaton, 1.

3 This sentiment was voiced by Charlotte at-large city councilman Edwin B. Peacock III (R), presentation at launch event for the report, “Charlotte: A Welcome Denied,” (Levine Museum of the New South in Charlotte, April 28, 2009).

4 See Xóchitl Bada, Oscar A. Chacón, and Jonathan Fox, Eds., Latino Immigrants in the Windy City: New Trends in Civic
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**CONTEXT MATTERS:**

Latino Immigrant Civic Engagement in Nine U.S. Cities

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5 Of immigrant marchers in those two years only 27 and 31 percent were non-citizens, according to survey results. See “Family Matters: Strategizing Immigrant Activism in Chicago” in Bada, Chacón, and Fox.


7 This compares against similar numbers for the City of Fresno, which at 2008 had a Hispanic or Latino population of approximately 44.6 percent and a Mexican-origin component of this population of 84.8 percent. Population data come from the U.S. Census, 2006-2008 American Community Survey: Three-Year Estimates, [www.factfinder.census.gov](http://www.factfinder.census.gov), as well as from the factsheet, City of Fresno Economic Development Department, “City of Fresno: Demographic Characteristics” (May 2008), [http://www.fresno.gov/NR/rdonlyres/B47C92C2-80E9-4C02-A714-5C3825490690/0/2008DemographicsCityandCounty.pdf](http://www.fresno.gov/NR/rdonlyres/B47C92C2-80E9-4C02-A714-5C3825490690/0/2008DemographicsCityandCounty.pdf). Accessed Feb. 8, 2010.

8 According to the most recent data available, naturalizations from the Fresno Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) numbered only 5,133 for fiscal year 2008, compared against more than 1 million in the same period for the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana CBSA, more than 24,000 for the San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara CBSA, and more than 37,000 for San Francisco. See the factsheet, "Persons Naturalized by Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) of Residence: Fiscal Years 1999 to 2008," *Yearbook of Immigration Statistics* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security), [http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/YrBk08Na.shtm](http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/YrBk08Na.shtm) (accessed February 8, 2010).


12 See Tuman, 32.


15 See U.S. Census, *The Hispanic Population: Census 2000 Brief* (May 2001), [http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf](http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-3.pdf) (accessed February 8, 2010). The brief indicates that at the 2000 Census, the population of Los Angeles County was 46.5 percent Latino or
Hispanic, and that of the county’s 4.2 million Latinos, 3.0 million were of Mexican origin.


17 Nebraska’s Latino population has risen significantly in the past two decades. From 1990 to 2007, Census figures show that the state’s Hispanic-Latino population rose 258 percent and increased even higher—311 percent—in the county that contains Omaha, one of the state’s two metropolitan areas. This growth came at a time when the state’s non-Hispanic population increased only 1.7 percent from the 2000 Census to the most recently published estimate from 2008. In fact, if current forecasts hold, Latinos will account for 96 percent of the state’s net population increase from 2005 to 2030. If these forecasts hold, the proportion of Latinos in the total state population will be around 15 percent, which is close to the current proportion of Latinos in the total national population. If Latino population growth were subtracted from this next-quarter-century projection, net population increase would be only 7,408, or 0.4 percent, from a total population that at 2007 stood at 1,711,263. According to the most recent Census estimates from July 2008, Latinos account for approximately 7.9 percent of the state’s population. Hispanic population estimate: 140,498; total population estimate: 1,783,432. See http://www.census.gov/popest/statessasrh/SC-EST2008-03.html.


20 Comparable state and national percentages are 26.2 and 11.1, respectively.


22 In February 2009, Arpaio marched 220 undocumented prisoners on a sensationalist “perp walk” for the media, relocating them to his controversial “Tent City” from a conventional prison, in a move thinly justified as a savings for county taxpayers. In October, following allegations of illegal sweeps and racial profiling, Arpaio’s office was dropped from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 287 (g) program, even though the sheriff has vowed to continue enforcement of federal immigration law citing the “inherent authority” of officers to do so.

More recently in April 2010, the Arizona state legislature passed and Gov. Jan Brewer signed what some consider the most draconian state-level immigration legislation ever. Senate Bill 1070, approved April 19, 2010 and signed into law April 23, 2010, makes it a state crime to be in the country without papers and would force local police to enforce federal immigration laws. One interpretation of the bill suggests that it would allow local police to stop and question any person they suspect of being undocumented and require that individual to produce proof of lawful residence or citizenship.


24 Requiring voters to present state-approved ID at the polls, the referendum also fell under criticism for targeting particular groups of the
legally voting population and for representing a modern “poll tax.”


26 For example if the DREAM Act advances in the U.S. Congress. DREAM stands for the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act. If passed, the act would give alien minors the opportunity to earn “conditional permanent residency,” provided they earn a university degree or serve honorably in the armed forces and meet other requirements. While enrolled at university, participants would have “temporary residency,” allowing them to qualify for in-state tuition at public universities in their state of residence.


28 According to the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS), 56 percent of Washington-area foreign-born Latinos, excluding Puerto Ricans, said they were citizens versus 30.1 percent nationally (Local Goes National, 19). Also see: http://depts.washington.edu/uwiser/documents/LNS_toplines_FIP_April16_2007.pdf. Additionally, 80 percent of eligible DC metro-area Latinos said they were registered to vote, and 70 percent indicated they had voted in 2004, according to the 2006 LNS (Local Goes National, 20). This compares against 77.4 percent reported registration and 61.6 percent reported turnout nationally, according to the 2006 LNS.


30 See Audrey Singer’s chapter, “Latin American Immigrants in the Washington Metropolitan Area: History and Demography.”

31 In fact, the metropolitan area’s general population is highly suburban, with only 10 percent of the population living in Washington, DC, proper, and it should be noted that the suburbs have been new sites of settlement not only for Latin American-born immigrants but also for foreign-born persons generally.

32 See Kate Brick’s chapter, “Key Issues for Latino Immigrant Engagement: A Dialogue among Leaders of the Local Community.”

APPENDIX

Partners, publications, and past and future events of the Latino Immigrant Civic Engagement Project

CHARLOTTE

Principal partner:
Helping Empower Local People (H.E.L.P.), an affiliate of the Industrial Areas Foundation
Chris Bishop, Executive Director

Past and future events:
“Looking at Latino Civic Engagement: The Roundtable Conference”
Sept. 14, 2007; Charlotte, NC

Launch of Charlotte: A Welcome Denied, held at Levine Museum of the New South, April 28, 2009; Charlotte, NC

Publications:

CHICAGO

Principal partner:
National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Communities (NALACC)
Oscar A. Chacón, Executive Director
Past and future events:

“Community Dialogue on Transnational Activism in Chicago – Strategies of Integration and Engagement”
Oct. 26-27, 2007; Chicago, IL

Community dialogue and launch of *Latino Immigrants in the Windy City: New Trends in Civic Engagement*
School of Social Service Administration, University of Chicago
May 20, 2010; Chicago, IL

Publications:


FRESNO, CA

Principal partner:

Pan Valley Institute of the American Friends Service Committee
Myrna Martínez Nateras, Director

Publications:


Past and future events:

Roundtable on Latino immigrant civic and political participation in Fresno
Aug. 30, 2007; Fresno City Hall; Fresno, CA

LAS VEGAS

Principal partner:

University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV), Institute for Latin American Studies
John P. Tuman, Director, Institute for Latin American Studies; Chair and Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, UNLV

Past and future events:

“Latin American Migrants: Civic and Political Participation in Las Vegas, Nevada”
Dec. 21, 2007; Las Vegas
Publications:


**LOS ANGELES**

**Principal partner:**

University of California Los Angeles (UCLA), Labor Center
Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, Project Director

**Events:**

“Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote: Latino Migrant Civic Engagement in L.A.”
May 2008, Los Angeles

**Publications:**


**OMAHA**

**Principal partner:**

Office of Latino/Latin American Studies (OLLAS), University of Nebraska at Omaha
Lourdes Gouveia, Director, OLLAS; Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Nebraska at Omaha
Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska at Omaha

**Past and future events:**

Latin American Migrants: Civic Engagement and Political Participation in Binational Context: Omaha, Nebraska Roundtable
December 16, 2007

**Publications:**

SAN JOSE

Principal partner:
Center for Labor Studies of the University of California, Santa Cruz
Jonathan Fox, Professor, Department of Latin American and Latino Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz

Events:
Roundtable on Latino immigrant civic engagement and political participation in San Jose, CA; April 25, 2009

Publications:

TUCSON

Principal partners:
Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME) and Binational Migration Institute of the Mexican American Studies & Research Center of the University of Arizona
Fundación México
Anna Ochoa O’Leary, Assistant Professor

Publications:
WASHINGTON, DC

Events:

“Latin American Immigrants: Civic and Political Participation in the Washington DC-Metro Area” November 1, 2007; Washington, DC

Publications:


RESEARCH PAPER SERIES


Visit www.wilsoncenter.org/migrantparticipation for more information about the Project and to access electronic versions of the publications.
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