Migrant civil society: Ten propositions for discussion

Jonathan Fox and William Gois. ¹

People’s Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights
Mexico City, November, 2010
http://www.accionglobalmexico.org

October 23, 2010

Migrant collective action takes many forms, often grounded in transnational communities and worker rights initiatives. These social foundations form the basis of ‘migrant civil society,’ which emerges in public spaces that extend across national borders.

What are some of the implications of putting together three words: ‘migrant civil society?’ Simply put, migrant civil society refers to migrant-led membership organizations and public institutions. Specifically, this includes four very tangible arenas of collective action. Each arena is constituted by actors, while each set of actors also constitutes an arena. These four arenas include: migrant-led membership organizations, autonomous public spaces (such as large-scale cultural or political gatherings), migrant-led NGOs, as well as migrant-led media. ²

The rationale for focusing on the migrant dimension of civil society is to encourage migrant actors, observers and potential allies to recognize the organizations through which migrants have built their capacity for self-representation - as a basis for more balanced coalition-building.

Indeed, migrant civil societies often emerge in dialogue with a broader civil society – though whether those relationships are local, long-distance, or both, varies widely. That is, migrant organizations tend to emerge either as part of newcomers’ civic engagement with their society of residence or in relationship the society of their homeland. In other words, this public sphere can refer either to the (e)migrant wing of a sending society, or to (im)migrant communities within a receiving society. These distinct arenas sometimes overlap, and one major question is where, when and under what conditions migrants engage both locally and transnationally. These cross-border and multilevel forms of active membership represent one dimension of the broader process of the formation of transnational civil society.

Clearly this umbrella category of collective action involves many different kinds of migrants. Notably, there is a fundamental difference between temporary migrant workers and immigrant worker communities, since short-term contract workers have many fewer opportunities to build their own institutions while abroad. Migrants also vary widely in terms of their interest in and capacity to remain engaged with their homelands. States and societies of origin, in turn, vary in terms of their stance towards their citizens abroad. Where do national societies see emigration as a social, civic or political issue? Meanwhile, within settled immigrant worker communities, clearly legal status and the political environment also shape capacity for collective action.

For migrant individuals and families, often one of the central dilemmas is how to overcome the feeling of being “neither from here nor from there.” Similarly, for migrant civil societies the challenge is how to overcome exclusion from both sending and host societies to reach recognition and inclusion “both here and there.” ³
The concept of migrant civil society is the point of departure for the following ten propositions for discussion, each of which is informed by a combination of research, coalition-building experience and advocacy practice. These propositions address a series of related analytical questions involving migrant organizations, struggles for rights and campaigns for development strategies that can provide alternatives to poverty and migration.

1. **The organizations that constitute migrant civil society are based on multiple, often overlapping collective identities.** Like collective action more generally, migrant organizations emerge from some combination of shared interests and shared identities. Some groups come together based primarily on their shared community or nationality of origin, perhaps encouraged by governmental or non-governmental actors from back home. Yet for organizing, shared migrant identities constitute a two-edged sword, because while they facilitate some organizing strategies, they can also block others.

Some migrant rights groups, in contrast, bring together migrants who come from multiple countries – most notably in order to focus on shared agendas of worker rights vis-à-vis employers, or for legal status vis-à-vis governments. In receiving societies, core challenges of human rights and legal status can create shared interests among migrants who otherwise differ widely in terms of national origin, language ethnicity, class, caste or ideology. Nevertheless, in spite of “objectively-shared interests,” conscious political strategies are usually required to bring together migrant workers of different national origins, as in the cases of domestic worker organizing in Hong Kong, led by politicized Filipinas, or Latino immigrant worker organizing initiatives in the US, often led by immigrants who were politicized in their home countries.  

From the point of view of migrant rights organizing, one of the most important distinctions is between groups that primarily focus on their home country, versus those whose primary agenda addresses the situation of migrants in their countries of residence. Over time, however, this distinction has eroded, as an increasing number of migrant organizations pursue agendas that are “both here and there.” In the process, migrants also organize through multiple channels simultaneously, coming together as workers at their workplace or as women or members of a distinct ethnic group – especially when their role in the labor market or community is specifically gendered or racialized. At the same time, they may organize, as members of the same village of origin when supporting community development back home, and as citizens of their home country or sympathizers of a homeland political party, when they call on their own governments to respond to their concerns. Yet while migrants may often pursue these different agendas simultaneously – through different organizations – their full repertoire of action may not be visible to migrants’ potential allies.

2. **Forms of social organization are shaped both by migrants themselves on the one hand, and by their political-institutional environments and the availability of non-migrant allies in host countries on the other.** Again, like collective action more generally, migrants do not organize in a vacuum. Their capacity to find the free spaces needed to come together in pursuit of common goals depends heavily on their social, civic, political and spatial environments. Freedom of movement and association is fundamental – yet that space varies widely across countries, workplaces and communities, and depends heavily on immigration status. Similarly, access to the kinds of information needed to organize (including shared language) is also highly uneven – yet it is crucial for identifying potential allies and for assessing opportunities for change.

While some governments clearly represent extreme cases of authoritarian control vs. democratic freedom, many do not fit neatly into these dichotomies. For example, some governments may impose limits on political rights (such as Hong Kong) or deny legal status to large numbers of
migrant workers (as in the US), while at the same time respecting some basic civil or social rights that matter significantly to migrants. Some degree of freedom of association is usually a fundamental precondition for collective action in defense of other rights. Safe spaces for association are crucial, as in the cases of churches for Filipinos abroad, or mosques in Hong Kong for Indonesian workers. However, there may be a sharp disconnect between migrants’ civil rights in principle, and the degree to which they can be exercised in practice -- as in the case of Central American migrants in Mexico, whose rights are abused with impunity.

The terrain of social rights for migrants may also be highly uneven, both within countries and across issue areas. Consider the contradictory disconnect between civil and social rights in the US, where undocumented workers can be summarily expelled at any time, often without due process, yet their children have the constitutionally-mandated right to attend public school, they have the legal right (at least on paper) to be attended in hospital emergency rooms in their own languages and their employers are supposed to respect federal minimum wage and occupational safety laws.

The host country environment also shapes the availability of potential allies for migrant rights among local and national social and political forces, such as religious institutions, trade unions, legal defense groups and political parties. Yet both the density and disposition of potential allies within host countries often varies widely, both geographically as well as across languages, religions, issue areas and ideologies. For example, migrants who share languages, religions or ideologies with significant forces within host country civil societies are likely to have more opportunities to build strong social ties across differences of nationality (contrast the close ties between Latin Americans and US Latinos with the situation of Muslim immigrants in Europe).

The political-institutional environment that shapes possibilities for migrant action includes the role of the sending and transit country governments as well. For example, in the face of persistent impunity for violators of the rights of transmigrants in Mexico, there is little evidence that — for example – Central Americans in Mexico feel sufficiently safe to “come out” publicly to protest their treatment. On the other hand, the Mexican government has responded in important ways to the demands of its nationals in the US to take an active role in their defense, including numerous measures to advocate for the undocumented. One of the most notable official Mexican responses has been the emission of millions of consular IDs (matrículas consulares) over the past decade.

The Mexican government and immigrant defense organizations have persuaded many local government agencies (including police) as well as financial institutions to accept this document as an official ID. Otherwise many Mexicans would be “doubly undocumented,” in that they would lack official recognition from both the US and their own country.

One way to sum up this proposition is that “context matters.” In other words, the local environment for organizing often varies greatly within both countries of settlement and countries of origin. The context varies in at least two major ways. First, the power of the opponents of migrant rights is unevenly distributed. Second, the power of potential migrant allies is unevenly distributed within countries. In the US, for example, the possibilities for forming powerful coalitions vary greatly because “immigrant-friendly” US institutions are much stronger in some cities than in others. Notably, the presence of the supportive churches, labor unions and the Spanish language broadcast media maps very unevenly across the US landscape. The core infrastructure for immigrant rights mobilization in the US rests not so much on national organizations as on multi-sectoral, city-level coalitions that bring together both migrant-led and US organizations. Most importantly, the breadth and density of immigrants’ most consistent coalition partners, the institutions of US Latino civil society, vary greatly across cities and states – as does US Latino citizens’ capacity for their own political representation.

3
This uneven terrain for the recognition of migrant voices is especially relevant because, while migrants have clearly demonstrated their capacity to build their own social and civic institutions, their capacity to take the next step and create voice and political power in the policy process requires building coalitions with established institutions. The creation of this shared space at the city/town or state/province level, in turn, can reshape the environment within which migrants decide when and how to engage in advocacy and collective action. This kind of “virtuous circle” represents one significant potential pathway for migrant empowerment – yet one that will only be discovered and understood if patterns of civic engagement are “unpacked” at the local level.

3. **Rights-based agendas rely on the UN human rights framework, built on the consensus of the international community.** While much of the international discourse about the rights of migrants is built with and framed by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, many migrants would have had none or minimal use of these rights prior to their migratory experience. Rights-based agendas emerge from a deep personal sense of justice and entitlement within individuals In a number of countries of origin, particularly where the state has a deliberate policy and target for the deployment of migrant workers with the objective of increasing remittances to fill state coffers, some pre-departure orientation programs do contain content that is relevant to the rights of migrant workers. However, this official discourse on rights is also undermined by some governments’ additional emphasis on responsibilities - to offset the possibility of migrants becoming ‘too empowered’ and not willing ‘to tolerate a little’ abuse of their rights in a ‘foreign context’. For example, Philippine government officials they have sometimes expressed their exasperation with migrants who come to the embassy or run away from their employers at the least infringement of their rights. In addition, Bangladeshi officials, when discussing about the ratification of the Migrant Workers Convention, have expressed concern that ratification might result in loss of job market opportunities for their nationals. It has also been said that migrants should be able to tolerate some infringement of rights, insofar as they do not have them even in their countries of origin.

Little consideration is given to the fact that the international human rights framework is directly linked to the principle of non-discrimination. As individuals, migrants possess notions of self-respect and self-dignity, and when they are violated, they feel a sense of injustice committed against them. The common experiences of abuse and violations of rights and denial of dignity -- when articulated -- finds support with the broader community. Yet the availability of support and redress mechanisms within the society then largely determine how far migrants will pursue a just settlement to their grievances. While migrant workers may not define their sense of entitlement in legal terms, such as claims to a right to equal pay, they feel their notions of self-respect and self-dignity are violated when, what they feel entitled to is incommensurate with what is available to them.

The discourse of human rights bridges moral (or “natural”) rights and legal rights. The challenge of context to a large extent also determines the securing of human and labor rights of all migrants irrespective of status. In many host countries, the human and labour rights communities willingly take up the cause of migrants who are in a documented or regular situation, but often struggle with finding ways to support migrants in an undocumented or irregular situation and sometimes migrants are even blamed for being in an undocumented status.

The interplay between these notions of inherent rights and dignity with context can be seen, for example, when domestic workers demand a day off – a call that is now backed by a global campaign. Meanwhile, the ILO continues to deliberate on the need for an International Convention on the recognition of domestic work as work. Another example of rights claimed by migrant workers involves their call for an end to the ‘official’ withholding of their travel and personal documents by employers, which thereby binds them and increases their vulnerability to
abuse and exploitation. This situation is further aggravated when the migrant’s legal status is tied to the employer and running away from such situation would automatically bring about a change in status from legal to undocumented, and therefore liable for arrest, detention, and deportation. This inherent understanding of a sense of injustice being committed has led the ILO and human rights advocates to denounce this practice as a contemporary form of slavery.

The rights-based agenda draws up from an inherent sense of injustice being committed, but to gain momentum needs a context in which support system, or opportunities for expressing grievances, protest, or calls for redress exists. This context in turn involves the rule of law, where national law and practice gives due regard to the international framing of the discourse of human rights. But how do rights claims get expressed outside of such a context? The recent labour protests in the Middle East among migrant workers are a good example of human beings having an inherent sense of justice and dignity. For example, when 2000 Bangladeshi workers took to the streets in Kuwait, they persuaded a major national newspaper to call for their government to defend their nationals’ rights. 9

Despite an environment where labour unrest is not tolerated, and redress and grievance mechanisms have yet to be fully established and made operational, complicated further by a scarce presence of human rights organizations or local support groups, migrant workers from South Asia found the courage to act as a collective, launching a street protest to demand the recognition of their rights and an end to the injustice experienced in terms of non-payment of wages. In South Korea, undocumented migrants have gone on to form their own union, with the support of the Korean Confederation of Free Trade Unions (KCFTU). They have persisted despite their leadership being systematically targeted for arrest, detention and deportation. Today a pending decision of the Supreme Court in relation to the rights of undocumented migrants in South Korea leaves hanging the moral and legal obligation of the State of South Korea to recognize and implement the right of all workers to freedom of association (ILO Convention No. 87) and collective bargaining (ILO Convention No. 98) codified by the ILO as core conventions and as Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.

The UN framework, which involves virtually every country in the world, provides the human rights discourse with a legitimate claim to universality. Through the consensus of the international community, the rights-based approach is able to substantiate the claim to universal human rights that transcends borders.

The foundational source for migrant rights originates from the mother of all Human Rights documents, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. The provisions are based under the principles of equality, non-discrimination, and indivisibility. Under the Declaration, human rights are held by all persons “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status” (Article 2). Human rights relevant to migrant workers can be found in various binding Conventions of the UN. The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), sets out the right to work, defined as the opportunity to gain their living by freely chosen or accepted work (Article 6). The work referred to in Article 6 must be decent work (Article 7). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) sets out that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour (Article 8).

The Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families entered into force in July 2003. It does not propose new rights for migrant workers. Rather, it seeks to particularize and highlight the distinctiveness of the vulnerability faced by migrant workers as they are not citizens of the country in which they are employed.
All UN instruments and other initiatives which make a claim on universality are in fact appealing to individual notions of indivisibility and inalienability. While rights-based agendas have a claim to universality, universality is not achieved through creating positive law, it must inherently be grounded on an individual notion of justice.

Finally, the current scale of global labour mobility and cross border migration has led to increased media attention. The regular reporting of abuses and exploitation of Indonesian migrant domestic workers and the active lobby work of migrant civil society in Indonesia and Malaysia has resulted in the forging of a bilateral agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia. However while there is much still to be hoped for in the bilateral agreement migrant civil society continues to ensure that the protection of the rights of migrant workers remains high on the government agenda. 10

This has advertently or inadvertently to a greater visibility of the plight of migrants, socialization of the human and labour rights of migrants, empowering migrants to speak of their situation and demand for change through participating in processes and policy discourses that determine the course of their lives, whether in countries of origin and destination. This media attention has broadened and challenged the human rights community to “operationalize” the international human rights frame, to make tangible the basic principle in which states are responsible for the protection of the human rights of their citizens even beyond their borders, as well as for every individual, regardless of citizenship status, within their geographical jurisdiction.

4. **Balancing the differences between service-oriented and defensive work on the one hand, and more strategic, policy advocacy work on the other requires sustained exchanges and deliberate strategies.** Assisting migrant workers requires many different forms at various levels. For one, migrants face hardships and trauma that affect them daily. Accordingly, it is important and necessary to have organizations that can respond directly to service them, whether by visiting them at detention centers, preparing them for return migration, counseling them, or providing shelter for distressed workers. The list of issues is legion. On the other hand, this type of service-oriented work would have no end if the root of these problems is not addressed through focused policy advocacy. Without a deliberate strategy that can initiate policy change which can protect the rights of migrants at each turn of the migration process, there will be no end to the incidences of exploitation.

The non-binding ILO Multilateral Framework provides a framework for states to develop more effective labour migration policies, which in turn informs civil societies on practical points for advocacy. The framework aims to foster cooperation and consultation among and between the tripartite constituents of the ILO. As an example, Migrant Forum of Asia works on a four level strategy. Level 1 focuses on upholding the personal dignity and well-being of migrant workers, which means ensuring medical services, providing financial aid, and providing community support. Level 2 involves redressing, exposing, and preventing rights violations or helping distressed migrants. Level 3 is about capacity-building, which means educating advocates, building solidarity between groups, and organizing collective action for advocacy. Level 4 addresses the root causes by continuing advocacy for policy change and investing in alternatives.

There can be and should be cohesion between the service-oriented work provided to migrant workers and policy advocacy. For example, service-oriented organizations can systematically record and categorize the cases that come to their doorsteps. These cases can be presented at the national, regional, and international levels as evidence of the need for protection. Such a course of action can only be effectively achieved through sustained exchanges between migrant aid groups committed to a concerted effort that has clear goals in engaging policymakers. Platforms of exchanges must be created and strengthened in order to foster a practical agenda that creates mutually supporting links between service and advocacy work.
5. **Campaigns for international rights-based agreements can motivate and sustain cross-border civil society coalitions, bringing rights-based approaches to broader, more diverse constituencies.** Local organizations are able to structure the agenda of their own policy advocacy under an already-established frame founded on an international platform. By invoking international agreements built on consensus, local organizations are better equipped to persuade their own governments.

If a state has not ratified the MWC, the first step would be to promote awareness about it. A campaign to ratify the Convention is an important opportunity for coalition-building. A substantive coalition promotes an image of credibility, which is crucial for engaging the government. Many sectors other than migrants have a direct interest in supporting the Convention, such as women’s groups and trade unions. Key groups and movements can be approached in order to build a larger movement. Coalitions also provide an avenue for fund raising. Some coalition members may be able to provide support in staff, travel expenses, and supplies, for example.

Target groups can be expanded at each stage from local, regional, to national. At each stage, there are immigrant or migrant rights organizations, trade unions, religious organizations, academic representatives, human rights organizations, civil rights groups, legal organizations, and other groups. In order to facilitate the coalition building, a committee or a campaign advisory committee can spearhead the campaign.

Once a coalition has been built, it must develop activities in various areas in order to engage in advocacy or lobbying. At the same time, it is important to consolidate the coalition and sustain the campaign through public education, media coverage, training of advocates, and building institutional support. Civil society has an integral part to play in contributing to the work of UN Special Procedures and Mandates, by engaging in fact-finding missions in different countries to investigate allegations of human rights violations. Civil society organizations have multiple levels of engagement with respect to ILO Conventions as well. Civil society can strengthen its position by building networks with other organizations and trade unions. Together, by holding national consultations and regional consultations with governments, civil society can advocate for policy change invoking international standards.

As national campaigns develop, they will have much to learn from, and share with others. Exposures of violations at international forums are an effective way of garnering attention. In order to bring states to bear responsibility within international frameworks and to strengthen the advocacy within countries, campaigns should look both regionally and world-wide for networking.

Migrant rights organizations and networks have used various tools, such as urgent appeals, video documentaries, newsletters, websites, and the production of information and education materials of their plight to call for and establish a growing solidarity with other actors of civil society in order to advance a rights based agenda. Developing a cross-sectoral approach has led migrant rights networks to forge solidarity with labour groups, trade networks, climate justice campaigns, and feminist and gender networks. Many of the campaigns, while locally grounded, also have a regional and international dimension to them as well, in the way they have been framed or positioned. Migrants’ participation in the anti-globalization struggle, global action against poverty, Jubilee South and Debt Relief, anti-WTO mobilizations, trade union movement, climate justice movement, and participation in fair trade programmes are but some examples of how migrants have been able to transcend the localization or personal dimension of their experience and participate in the framing of the same in an analysis that bears on a common experience of being under privileged or exploited by a coalition of transnational companies, an elite class, and
multi-lateral institutions that create situations commonly understood as the push and pull factors of migration.

An excellent example of how campaigns for international rights-based agreements can motivate and sustain cross-border civil society coalitions, bringing rights-based approaches to broader, more diverse constituencies is the recently concluded (8th-12th October) 4th World Social Forum on Migration in Quito Ecuador, and the 3rd meeting of the Peoples Global Action. The Mexico City PGA is actually the fifth such gathering. The process began in 2006 - when the UN held its High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, advocacy groups held a parallel event on migration, development and human rights. In 2007, the first official Global Forum on Migration and Development, held in Brussels, was also accompanied by a parallel civil society forum on migration, development and human rights. It was in 2008, during the preparatory process in the Philippines that the local organizing committee decided to call it Peoples Global Action on Migration, Development and Human Rights, to reflect the spirit of the mobilization and the participations of migrant civil society, labour unions, and the social movements), which has become a converging space for various migrant and civil society networks, to sustain cross-border solidarity and action while targeting the inter-governmental Global Forum on Migration and Development for critical engagement in terms of process, discourse, programme and implementation, to hold true to a multi-stakeholder rights-based perspective on migration.

6. **Migrant organizations often come together in networks, but only some networks can sustain coalitions.** In practice, the term “coalition” is often used interchangeably with “networks,” “campaigns,” and “movements.” These terms all refers to efforts that bring together distinct actors, where the whole is hopefully greater than the sum of the parts. These everyday terms describe very different kinds of relationships between partnerships, and it useful to distinguish between them. While it may seem “merely academic” to attempt to differentiate a network from a coalition, more explicit discussion of different possible meanings behind the terms could be useful insofar as partnerships are bolstered by shared expectations regarding their goals and capacities.

What, then, is the difference between networks, coalitions and movement? There are many definitions of “network,” and Keck and Sikkinka’s classic study offers a succinct formulation: “networks are forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange” (1998: 8). Coalitions, in contrast are partnerships among distinct actors that coordinate action in pursuit of shared goals (Fox 2010). Conceptually, the terms coalitions and alliances are very similar; both refer to different actors who share projects.

In the process, the actual use of these terms can be confusing. Some dense coalitions refer to themselves as networks. Some thin networks refer to themselves as coalitions. Coalitions can also start off by bringing different groups together, but then they may take off and become instead their own distinct organization, one that is no longer based on their original members but still called a coalition. Some coalitions of disparate actors describe themselves as movements, overstating their degree of cohesion and shared collective identity. Some movements may express themselves as coalitions of organizations. Meanwhile, the global justice movement has been described as a “movement of movements.”

Networks, coalitions or movements can all engage in specific campaigns, which usually refer to joint actions with very specific goals, targets and time horizons. Though when networks engage in actual campaigns, they shift from exchange to joint action and become more like coalitions. One way to frame the distinction between networks, coalitions and movements is to consider each term as referring to a different point along a continuum of varying degrees of organizational
density and social cohesion. Moreover, transnational coalitions face challenges that are similar to those faced by within-country coalitions – when they cross boundaries of class, gender, race, language or national origins.

The puzzle is that while movements are always grounded in social networks, only some social networks generate movements. The idea of movements also implies a high degree of shared collective identity, for example, yet neither networks nor coalitions necessarily involve significant horizontal exchange between participants. Indeed, many transnational networks and coalitions rely on a handful of interlocutors to manage relationships between broad-based social organizations that may have relatively little awareness of the nature and actions of their counterparts. At the same time, some transnational movements achieve such a high degree of shared symbolism that active members can identify strongly with each other in spite of very limited actual direct contact – as in the emblematic case of the anti-apartheid movement of in the 1970s and 1980s.

The concept of transnational social movement suggest a much higher degree of density and much more cohesion than is involved in networks or coalitions. The more precise term “transnational movement organization” suggests an organized membership base that is present in more than one country, as in the case of the Binational Front of Indigenous Organizations (FIOB) in the US and Mexico. Yet many migrant organizations, though cross-border in their worldviews and agendas, do not necessarily involve organized social bases in their country of origin.

Distinguishing between networks, coalitions and movements also help to avoid blurring political differences and power imbalances within what may appear from the outside to be implicitly more homogeneous transnational movements. As Keck and Sikkink point out, transnational networks face the challenge of developing a “common frame of meaning” in spite of cross-cultural differences (1998: 7). In practice, such shared meanings are socially constructed through joint action and mutual understanding rather than merely through professed values and goals. Political differences within transnational networks are also not to be underestimated, in spite of apparently shared goals.

Coalitions are often a means to an end. One of the questions, then, is under what conditions do networks become coalitions, in the sense of member agreement to sustain joint action? The interest-based principle of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” may be enough to account for coalition formation among nation-states or political parties, but is rarely sufficient for civil society actors. While shared political ideologies certainly facilitate coalition formation, but they are not a precondition. Yet some basis for shared values is often key for bringing civil society organizations together in spite of many other differences. As a practical matter, however, shared targets are usually necessary to go beyond feelings of solidarity to inspire and sustain joint action. Shared targets help to answer the ever-present “what is to be done” question. International agreements, organizations and official gatherings often provide these shared targets, without which many disparate organizations would not necessarily come together.

In other words, transnational exchanges between social organizations can produce networks, which can produce coalitions, which can produce movements. Note that underscoring these distinctions does not imply any judgment that more cross-border cooperation is necessarily better. On the contrary, realistic expectations about what is possible are critical to sustain any kind of collective action. Indeed, cross-border cooperation involves significant costs and risks that must be taken into account, and depends heavily on finding both appropriate counterparts with whom to cooperate.
These conceptual points draw from the decade-long “Diálogos” process of regular exchanges between social organizations in Mexico, the US and Canada (1988-1998). Their organizing principle was to bring together counterparts to exchange perspectives on the social and political dimensions of North American integration. This concept of counterpart social organizations and public interest groups does not imply similarity or agreement, but rather analogous roles in their respective societies (Brooks 1992, Brooks and Fox 2002). For example, in the US-Mexico-Canada context this meant bringing together unions of auto workers, telephone workers and teachers, family farmer organizations, immigrant rights defenders, anti-toxics activists and human rights advocates to the same table - with their respective cross-border counterparts. In contrast to solidarity gatherings, many of these counterparts did not necessarily share underlying political ideologies (or even specific political stances on NAFTA). Most were primarily domestically-oriented groups who were addressing globalization for the first time. These structured conversations led to greater mutual understanding, and the terms of engagement included a willingness to “agree to disagree” in order to find specific areas of common ground.

7. The construction of civil society coalitions that bring together organizations from both host and sending countries requires a conscious strategy and sustained investment. Transnational activism allows for the inclusion of many different types of actors and thus, leads to an open or expansive perspective on advocacy networks. It is all the more important to recognize that the short-term nature of migratory flows has had implications on fomenting “membership” in the traditional sense. Trade unions have traditionally been nationally oriented, although there have been emerging changes. In order to incorporate migrant workers into the overall political struggle to uphold workers’ rights in general and to address temporary or undocumented migrants’ specific grievances, there is a need to enhance collaboration between trade unions and migrant organizations. Migrant worker organizations can benefit from trade union structures as unions tend to have the financial leverage and political clout, which migrant organizations might not have. Migrant workers play an important role in regional and national markets beyond merely filling jobs. Migrant workers can invigorate the overall labour movement in favour of trade unions.

Examples of coalitions include MFA, a network of Asian organizations, which works directly with trade unions and local organizations that work closely with national trade unions. To name a few examples within the MFA network, in the Philippines, the Center for Migrants Advocacy (CMA) works with the national trade unions in lobbying. In Indonesia, MFA works in collaboration with Indonesian Migrant Workers Trade Union and with the Federation of Trade Unions in Burma. In a more concerted effort, MFA has participated at the International Labor Conference. Based in Manila, MFA continues to grow through membership in both sending and receiving countries.

MFA is also part of an international network, Migrant Rights International (MRI registered in Geneva but is co-ordinated by an international steering committee whose members are based in the different regions of the world. Coordination is undertaken through email communications, skype and conferences and the development of common activities in spaces that promote a rights-based approach such as the Human Rights Council, the International Labour Conference, and through creating opportunities for representation. Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) is another member of MRI. Based in Belgium, it focuses on promoting respect for the rights of undocumented workers within Europe by forging a link between the grassroots organizations and policy advocates at the European level. Both PICUM and MFA are structured around a secretariat, an executive committee, and a general assembly. PICUM now has a network of over 100 member organizations and 105 individual members providing humanitarian support throughout Europe.
Migreurop is an association based in France, which has as its members, individuals as well as organizations throughout France, Italy, Belgium, and Spain. Migreurop has analyzed various policies of regulating migration and has documented numerous violations of migrants’ fundamental rights with regard to detention and custody. It has emerged as incorporating an array of researchers, activists, and other associations.

The coalition’s capacity to successfully advocate for policy change depends upon the cohesion of the groups involved and sharing of resources. A realistic agenda which engages the abilities of migrant civil society is not achievable without maximizing the skills of the different organizations. The nature of migration calls on the need of both host and sending countries to play an integral role in a coalition. Moreover, such engagement within civil society must be consistently sustained in order to effectively carry out short-term campaigns and steer the next course of action.

8. **Organized migrants in diverse settings seek representation and accountability by engaging with their home nation-states through diverse repertoires and multiple channels.** Migrants’ home-country oriented political engagement involves a wide range of approaches, ranging from exchanging political subordination for official support for migrant concerns to confrontation with home country authorities, sometimes including challenges to the legitimacy of regimes that violate the human rights of citizens still at home. In addition, the migrants’ widely-varying terms of departure from their homelands also affects their approach to their home governments. While the government of the Philippines organizes a highly regulated departure process, serving as a platform for ongoing engagement, the government of Bangladesh has little credibility with migrants, who tend not seek contact. Similarly, though Pakistan has been sending workers to the Gulf since the 1970s, they have no civil society champion at home to encourage the state to defend them – so few would turn to their home state while abroad. In this context, the Philippines government’s proactive stance is increasingly seen as a model for other Asian governments that pursue strategies of “deploying” their workers abroad (notably Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as Bangladesh, Cambodia and Nepal). Similarly, Mexico’s migrant outreach institutions are widely seen as models in Latin America. Yet the Philippines’ and Mexico’s governmental institutions for engaging with their citizens abroad were forged primarily in response to protest and advocacy by migrants, which complicates efforts at replication by other governments.

These two experiences raise the broader question of when and how do organized migrants engage in policy advocacy with their home governments, to encourage them both to defend migrant rights abroad and/or to pursue alternative development strategies at home? The response of home country governments has been very uneven in terms of these two agendas. On the one hand, governments of the Philippines and Mexico, have been officially willing to accept some degree of responsibility for defending their nationals rights abroad. The 1995 execution of a Filipina domestic worker in Singapore triggered a wave of protest both among migrant workers and within the Philippines, leading to major legislation that committed embassies to provide legal and other services to migrant workers. In the Mexican case, a wave of unprecedented migrant political support for an opposition electoral challenger led the Mexican government to design a multi-faceted strategy of engagement that included bolstering an extensive consular network that provides a wide range of legal and social support services, as well as new channels for official dialogue between Mexican migrant civil society and the state. Yet those same nation-states have shown no disposition to question their labor-exporting economic development models, so it is no coincidence that they have framed the “migration and development” agenda exclusively in terms of how to invest remittances rather than in terms of how to avoid migration. On the contrary, both governments re-imagined their official discourses to honor migrant workers as national heroes.
In addition to migrant engagement with their states of origin to help to defend their rights abroad, there is an increasing official recognition that migrants retain their citizenship rights vis-à-vis their state at home. The number of states and territories that have begun to institutionalize some form of the right to vote reached 115 states and territories in 2007 (IDEA/IFE, 2007:11). Eleven nation-states even assign legislative seats to represent their nationals abroad. The recognition of migrant voting rights is increasingly seen as part of universal suffrage, a core democratic right (Rhodes, Sybil and Arus Harutyyunyan, 2010). These voting rights reforms often require overcoming the opposition of national politicians who fear the possibility of having to respond to a segment of the electorate that is far from their reach. In sharply divided societies, such as Sri Lanka, these fears of a politically empowered diaspora have blocked the extension of voting rights. In practice, however, migrant votes have rarely determined national electoral outcomes.

In many cases, governments have ceded long-distance voting rights reforms in response to migrant civic action campaigns, following national democratization processes. Granting the right to vote provides a major form of symbolic recognition of migrant citizenship in their home countries, and sometimes has the spillover effect of empowering migrants to attempt to hold their government accountable in defense of a broader range of rights. For example, Filipino undocumented migrants engage more with consular apparatus because they are recognized as voters. Mexican migrant organizations in the US, empowered with the vote, expect their consulates to serve them, and have formed coalitions with government strategists interested in engaging with the diaspora to create channels of binational representation – most notably a large elected advisory council of the government’s Institute for Mexicans Abroad.

Yet in practice, many regimes have also retained sharp restrictions on how voting rights may be exercised. The Philippines, for example, requires overseas voters to return to the country within three years, under threat of losing their voting rights forever. In Mexico, national political parties are forbidden from campaigning outside the country, and potential voters must register to vote at home – which poses a significant challenge to migrants who lack the legal status needed to cross borders safely. In these two cases, migrants account for approximately 10% of their respective national populations, yet migrant voters represented extremely small shares the national electorate in the most recent presidential elections in each country. Contrast this turnout with the 2006 wave of street protests against the criminalization of undocumented workers that swept the United States, with at least 3.5 million marchers.

To sum up, though many migrants have indeed become immigrants, insofar as their primary struggle is for recognition and rights where they are settled, migrants have also often contributed to the democratization of their state of origin – both by campaigning for responsiveness while abroad, and by calling for accountability when at home.

9. **Migrant engagement with development projects at home can matter a great deal for social infrastructure, but has had difficulty creating the sustainable jobs needed to avoid future migration.** So far, the migration and development agenda has been largely confined to the question of how remittances can help to improve social indicators through transfers within families. While these transfers clearly improve living standards and access to services (including education, which should be considered an investment), only a small fraction of remittances generates public goods – even in countries whose governments offer matching funds. These social infrastructure projects are the focus of many optimistic accounts of governmental migration and development projects. In Mexico’s “paradigm case” matching fund programs, however, a very small share of these resources go to sustainable job creation. While “banking the
unbanked” is certainly important to those sending remittances, the connection to broader development remains uncertain. Creative model projects for the productive investment of remittances remain few in number and tiny in scale. As a result, while the “migration and development” agenda clearly address the quality of life of non-migrants (primarily family members and their neighbors), it has yet to address the systemic reasons for the lack of employment opportunities in communities of origin.

There are many reasons why migrant-led community development projects have yet to focus on productive investment on a significant scale. Consider the dearth of investment opportunities in so many sending communities, as well as the critical need for on-the-ground entrepreneurial and technical capacity. The issues of economic viability are compounded by the structure of the long-distance decision-making process. Credible oversight is key to the viability of such collective remittance projects. 27 This raises the question, however, of the role of the citizens of the community of origin, as well as their public officials, who are sometimes democratically elected. Their degree of involvement in the selection and oversight of migrant-led projects varies widely, from one extreme of being largely bypassed by well-organized migrants, to another extreme in which mayors travel abroad to induce migrants to form hometown clubs to petition for funds to support his project agenda. In the well-known Mexican Three-for-One program, until recently most hometown association-led projects lacked balanced local civil society counterparts with whom to share project decision-making and oversight. Only recently have large numbers of local project committees been launched, known as “mirror clubs,” with support from the Mexican Social Development Ministry.” 28

Moreover, there are important differences between “public goods”-type community development projects vs. economic development projects that involve investment in private enterprises (including small-scale cooperatives). When organized migrants pool their hard-earned money for hometown development projects, they place a premium on those investments that provide benefits to the community as a whole. Most job-creating investments, in contrast, directly affect only a small subset of the community (at least at first, before scaling up). In addition, the benefits of such projects may be perceived as at risk of being captured by local elites or well-connected kinfolk – in a context in which ‘long-distance accountability’ is difficult.

Another dimension of the migration and development agenda that poses a potential dilemma that for organized migrants involves the possibility that host country governments will link official development to sending country efforts to control out-migration. For example, in 2007 the French government created a Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-Development. “Co-development” (later “cooperative development”) refers to all development assistance projects involving migrants in France. This agency is tasked with placing migration at the center of development policy, though it receives only 1-2% of French bilateral aid. 29 Some French advocacy organizations question both whether development leads to less migration as well as the French government’s “use of development aid as an incentive in negotiations with countries of origin on migration control.” 30 The French government has used this modest aid to encourage African countries to support the repatriation of both their own nationals and those of third countries. 31

The persistent disconnect between the migration and a development agenda that goes beyond local infrastructure may be related to the “project” framework that dominates remittance-led approaches to development. In the Mexican context, for example, this project-led framework has not been accompanied by a broader focus on an alternative development policy agenda. Even those states that have been governed by political leaders who are ostensibly open to policy
dialogue with organized migrants have yet to pursue alternative policy strategies that are more effective at generating substantial increases in employment.

If the causes of under-employment are systemic, then national level policy shifts are required to encourage job creation on the scale necessary to create viable alternatives to migration. In the case of middle-income sending countries, the main constraint is not necessarily public resources, but is rather involves the priorities that guide the allocation of available resources – as indicated by the example of Mexican farm subsidy checks, which totaled more than US$20 billion since 1994, but were not directed primarily to small-scale family farmers. Yet national level pro-employment that involve redirecting the major flows of public resources may potentially threatens vested interests – in contrast to the project-level focus on local social infrastructure investments.

The question of whether to focus migration and development advocacy agendas on (trans)local projects vs. broader development policies can easily be presented as though the first approach is “pragmatic” whereas the second is more “political.” After all, a project-led approach has the advantage of the potential for tangible results in the relatively short term, and has a low risk of direct confrontation with home country governments. A project-led approach also allows hometown associations to engage directly with local governments and communities back home. Advocacy for alternative development policies, in contrast, involves both a larger scale approach and a longer time horizon, with more uncertain linkages between potential reforms and impacts on clearly-defined constituencies in specific places.

Yet pragmatic-sounding project initiatives may be far from apolitical. Consider the design of Mexico’s 3 x 1 matching fund program – one of its well-known strengths is that it draws on contributions from federal, state and local governments, but that structure gives effective veto power to each level of government. This required level of consensus has led to a high concentration of projects in the small number of states in which organized migrants have political leverage vis-a-vis state governments. Meanwhile, migrant associations that campaign against human rights violations at home, or in favor of broader development policy alternatives – not to mention association with the political opposition – may well be excluded from access to governmental matching funds. In this context, the choice to prioritize short-term, local projects is clearly a political decision.

The political context for migrant advocacy for alternative development could also change if and when a home country government comes to power that includes forces that are willing to question a labor export strategy and prioritize job creation at home – as in the recent case of El Salvador. In this context, organized migrants may be able to move forward both with translocal projects and by contributing to national efforts to change economic development policy. More generally, the key to building alternative development agendas involves more effective coalition-building with civil society and political actors in the country of origin that are also committed to policies that would encourage large-scale job creation.

10. The coalitional dynamics involved in campaigning for migrant rights are different from those involved in addressing development issues and the causes of migration.

There has been persistent disconnect between campaigns for migrant rights in receiving countries, on the one hand, and home country campaigns for national alternative development policy agendas on the other. These two agendas for change may or may not fit neatly together. Consider the structure of interests involved – the agendas of current migrants may have limited overlap
with those of potential future migrants, who may have a bigger stake in encouraging their own governments to pursue serious pro-job creation development strategies at home.

Consider the case of the debate over the future of “unauthorized” workers in the US. The current balance of political forces in the US suggests that in any scenario for immigration reform in the near future, there will be tradeoffs involving the treatment of current and future migrants. Specifically, some fraction of current migrants might be able to regularize their status, but in the context of a further tightening of border controls and harsher measures against those migrants who unable to access what may be a very arduous, punitive and possibly exclusionary regularization process. If this prediction is correct, this political-institutional context could create a tension within migrant civil society between current and potential future migrants. Any opportunity for regularization is very likely to be limited to (some) current migrants, whereas the further hardening of the border will affect future migrants. Meanwhile, while regularization of status is the most pressing issue for current migrants, the national development agenda will have the most direct impact on potential future migrants. This structure of interests poses dilemmas for building and sustaining shared cross-border migration and development agendas.

Meanwhile, from a sending country perspective, in an effort to craft a new way of framing the relationship between migration and development, Mexican rural development strategist Armando Bartra bridges the migration, development and rights agendas with the call for respect for ‘the right to not [have to] migrate’ (2003, Global Exchange 2008). After all, the Mexican Constitution still speaks of citizens’ right to ‘dignified and socially useful work.’ The ‘right to not migrate’ can be a useful bridging concept for promoting reflection and discussion between diverse and sometimes disparate actors who see the process differently. This principle recognizes that while migration is an option, it is a choice made within a context imposed by public policies that enable some development strategies over others.

One of the most important approaches to bridging the migration, rights and development agendas involves the growing consolidation of cross-border coalitions that bring together migrants of different national origins. Migrant Forum in Asia includes organizations based in both sending and receiving countries in Asia and organizes its work around tasks forces committed to working on issues related to the feminization of labour migration, capacity building and advocacy, partnering with organizations in West Asia, right to access to health, and in coalition building programmes such as trade union – NGO collaboration, and campaigns that focus on the rights of migrant workers, migrant domestic workers, and the universal ratification of the migrant workers convention. 34

In the US, the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (NNIRR) established in 1986, brings together grassroots community, religious, labor, civil rights and legal organizations to help build a social movement in support of the rights of immigrants and refugees. 35 It has organized regional and national campaigns and conferences; supported the development of diverse immigrant community leadership, including the development of capacity building resources and training opportunities; spearheaded rallies and marches; initiated communications networks; produced newsletters, reports and educational materials; and established a reputation for articulating clear and progressive positions and analyses. Among its strategic aims are to integrate and connect immigrant communities and the immigrant rights movement with global social and economic justice movements and to strengthen the leadership and vision of the immigrant rights movement within a human rights perspective.
The National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Communities (NALACC), is an alliance of community-based Latin American and Caribbean migrant-led organizations that works to improve the quality of life in their communities both in the United States and in their countries of origin. NALACC seeks to build transnational leadership and has focused a great deal of its work in trying to reform US immigration policies that address the root causes of migration as well as the challenges faced by migrants in the United States. NALACC’s cross-border advocacy engagement with home country policies distinguishes it from other immigrant-led organizations. At the same time, NALACC’s its migrant-led character distinguishes it from established US Latino organizations that have close ties with elected officials.

The recently-formed (2010) Pan-African Network for Migrants Rights in Mali came about after initial discussions on an African perspective and critique on the migration and development discourse during the participation of African based and African Diaspora groups at the Peoples Global Action on Migration Development and Human Rights in Manila in 2008. In its inaugural assembly the Network decided to consolidate its membership and to work collaboratively in building the capacities of its member organizations in participating in International fora in order to put forward a greater representation of African issues, challenges, critique, and perspective on the advancement of the fundamental rights of all migrant workers as the framework from which the migration and development programmes need to be viewed.

It is in the convening of common spaces such as the PGA on Migration, Development and Human Rights and the World Social Forum on Migration, and other global civil society process and mobilizations that migrant organizations and immigrant communities has been able to not only have the opportunity to engage in a cross-fertilization of ideas, but also forge solidarities where in they have become ‘arenas of collective action’ where each arena is constituted by actors, while each set of actors also constitutes an arena.

Conclusions

These 10 propositions for discussion suggest the following recommendations:

1) A genuine recognition of the role that migrant civil society plays in a multi-dimensional and multi-stake holder discourse, policy setting agenda, and programmes on migration. In this regard, the GFMD process, now in its 4th year, has yet to come up with an effective model of taking into consideration the inputs from the civil society deliberations. The Mexico model of engagement with the Civil Society Days of the GFMD together with the Peoples Global Action is definitely a very big improvement in terms of process, but remains untested in terms of its effectiveness. The challenge would be to develop mechanisms in between GFMD meetings, to permit sustained civil society engagement at the multi-lateral level.

2) Civil societies in both sending and receiving countries should recognize migrants’ experience as one that goes beyond the individual or even collective human and labour rights violations and engage with migrants to gain a greater understanding of the migratory pressures that have been triggered by the global neo-liberal economic development paradigm. The cross-sectoral alliance building approach is crucial for developing a deeper analysis and critique of the migration phenomena today, and to build a peoples solidarity in the face of abuse and exploitation.

3) Resources should be mobilized for the support of migrant-led organizations and support institutions, networks, and platforms, so that they can develop programmes that build capacities that give voice to migrants’ perspectives on how they can be fuller members of society. Both the World Social Forum on Migration (WSFM) and the Peoples Global Action on Migration
Development and Human Rights have been processes largely initiated and driven by migrant civil society, with extremely limited resources, despite the best efforts in mobilizing global migrant civil society. It would be worth exploring more institutional support for the WSFM scheduled to be held in South Korea in 2012 and for the PGA in 2011.

4) Existing and emerging cross-border and transnational migrant alliances, coalitions, networks and movements need to be recognized by state authorities as representative, in an inclusive manner, without them having to forge a single identity or a single voice. The plurality and diversity of migrant civil society needs to be appreciated for a deeper understanding of the complexity of the migration cycle.

5) Migrant civil society needs to be more vigilant to take into account discourses that create discontent and fragmentation within the sector, such as, sending country and receiving country perspective, migrant worker vs. immigrant, migrant vs. diaspora, documented vs. undocumented, economic migrant vs. refugees, migrant led vs. migrant support, migrant vs. trafficked vs. smuggled, etc. Such categorizations, while ‘important’ in that they help to campaign for specific policies and programmes that would address specific vulnerabilities and exploitation, can also be limiting, insofar as they lead individuals and programmes within the categorizations to become myopic, and even destructively competitive in seeking redress and programmes that alleviate their cause. Much deliberate and concerted effort needs to be put into the forging of a common agenda that draws on a critical analysis that hinges on the larger, shared framing of the issues from which the different circumstances emerge.

6) Serious and intense work needs to be done within migrant civil society to sensitive media to the issues and concerns of migrant workers, to address negative media perceptions that fuel hate and discrimination against migrants – as well as to shore up more public support for the recognition of migrants as agents of social change and development, both in countries of origin and destination.

The freedom of association and collective bargaining are core labour rights as defined by the International Labour Organization. The fundamental nature of this right was also recently recognized by the UN Human Rights Council through the adoption of a resolution, without a vote, to establish a new Special Procedures mandate titled ‘Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association’ (A/HRC/15/L/23). In many host countries, migrants are denied this right and where it does exist, migrant workers are often hesitant to exercise it for fear of losing their jobs. It is imperative that these fundamental rights not be denied to migrants, and that they be free to join and form their own associations and trade unions, along lines of affinity or shared experience in order to best advance their issues.

7) For the purposes of integration and developing a multi-cultural society, migrants and their communities must be able to enjoy their social rights on the basis of equality with that of nationals, in strict adherence to the fundamental principle of non-discrimination on which all international human rights law is framed. For the same reasons, migrants should be able to exercise their civil and political rights, both in their country of origin as well as destination, as temporary or permanent residents, in the local elections. Recognition of the social and political rights of migrants is key to the empowerment of migrants and their communities. It goes beyond the ‘migration for remittances’ mode of state-driven migration and calls for an authentic and accountable basis for the linkages drawn between migration and development.

8) Migrants in an undocumented and irregular status should not be treated as threats to national security, targeted for arbitrary arrest, detention and deportation. Instead, the situation of undocumented and irregular migrants should be framed within the discourse of human security and as a ‘situation created’ by the dynamics of a cut-throat global market economy in which
undocumented and irregular migrants are a ‘necessary factor’ in a race to the bottom of the barrel in terms of cheap wages in order to be competitive in the global market.

9) To avoid the undermining of the international human rights treaties and a polarization of the developed and developing world it is imperative that member states of the United Nations adopt, ratify and effectively monitor the implementation the UN 1990 Convention on The Rights Of All Migrant Workers And Members Of Their Families and other related ILO and UN Conventions, Recommendations, and Frameworks related to migration.

10) Move beyond the framing of current migratory flows in terms of ‘migration and development,’ as if there is a co-relation between the two. The agency of migrants and migrant civil society has yet to be find authentic, transparent and accountable space in the development agenda of countries of origin and destination. The Global Forum on Migration and Development needs to progress towards a more comprehensive approach to the linkages between migration and development, going beyond the few and small / medium scale projects to engage with national development and international development policies with the full participation of migrant civil society in their design, monitoring and implementation. It is time for member states of the United Nations to move away from the polemics and politicization, and follow through with the standing resolution of the UN General Assembly calling for a UN Conference on Migration and Development.
Bibliography


Bada, Xóchitl, “Mexican Hometown Associations as Accountability Agents: Opportunities and Challenges in Participatory Planning for Community Development in Michoacán,” presented at the Latin American Studies Association, Toronto, October, 2010


Burgess, Katrina, “Translocal Networks and Democratic Accountability in Mexico,” presented at the Latin American Studies Association, Toronto, October, 2010


Fine, Janice, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, Ithaca: Cornell 2006


Fernández de Castro, Rafael, Rodolfo García Zamora and Ana Vila Freyer (eds.) El Programa 3x1 para migrantes: ¿Primera política transnacional en México? Mexico City: Ed. Miguel Angel Porrúa/Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México/Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas


----- “Repensar lo rural ante la globalización: La sociedad civil migrante,” Migracion y Desarrollo, No. 5, 2006, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6f2225fp

----- Accountability Politics: Power and Voice in Rural Mexico, Oxford University Press, 2007


Fox, Jonathan and Libby Haight (eds.) Subsidios para la desigualdad: Las políticas públicas del maíz en México a partir del libre comercio, Mexico: Wilson Center/CIDE/UC Santa Cruz, 2010 (also published in English as Subsidizing Inequality: Mexican Corn Policy since NAFTA, See full online versions @ www.wilsoncenter.org/DesarrolloRuralMexicano and www.wilsoncenter.org/MexicanRuralDevelopment

García Zamora, Rodolfo, Desarrollo económico y migración internacional: los desafíos de las políticas públicas en México, Zacatecas: Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, 2009

García Zamora and Manuel Orozco (eds.) Migración internacional, remesas y desarrollo local en América Latina y el Caribe, Mexico City: Ed. Miguel Angel Porrúa/Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas/Inter-American Dialogue, 2009


Ishkander, Natasha, Creative State: Forty Years of Migration and Development Policy in Morocco and Mexico, Ithaca: Cornell University, 2010


Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Border, Ithaca: Cornell, 1998


Migrant Forum in Asia, “Models of Transnational Organizing: MFA’s Experience in Asia,” XXX


Pangsapa, Piya, “When Battlefields become Marketplaces: Migrant Workers and the Role of Civil Society and NGO Activism in Thailand,” International Migration, XXX, 2009


Rannveug Agunias, Dovelyn (ed.), Closing the Distance: How Governments Strengthen Ties with Their Diasporas, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009

Rannveug Agunias, Dovelyn and Niel G. Ruiz, “Protecting Overseas Workers: Lessons and Cautions from the Philippines,” Migration Policy Institute, Sept. 2007
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/migration_development.php

Rodriguez, Robyn Magalit, Migrants for Export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor to the World, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010


Stephen, Lynn, Crossborder Lives: Indigenous Oaxacans in Mexico, California, and Oregon, Duke University, 2007

Teo, Youyenn and Nicola Piper, “Foreigners in Our Homes: Linking Migration and Family Policies in Singapore,” Population, Place and Space, 15, 2009


Waldinger, Roger, “A Limited Engagement: Mexico and its Diaspora” 2009, University of California, Los Angeles, Sociology Dept., manuscript
Notes:

1 Thanks to the AGP conveners for proposing this virtual collaboration. Authors’ names are in alphabetical order.

2 Note that this definition follows the long tradition of defining civil society in contrast to both state and market, and therefore does not include most private sector actors (with the notable exception of migrant-oriented mass media, which it exists). For further discussion of migrant civil society, see Fox (2005, 2007) and Fox and Bada (2008).

3 Migrants in earlier historical periods faced many similar issues. For a comprehensive review of the historical literature, see Moya (2005).


5 For a ethnographic analysis of simultaneous multiple migrant identities, see, among others, Stephen (2007).

6 Contrast the degree of freedom of association in Hong Kong and Singapore, for example. Hong Kong’s greater openness allowed the city to become a pioneering arena of Filipino migrant political activism, who in turn remain among the most active in Asia. Consider also the incipient protests by Burmese migrant workers in Thailand – though they are isolated and treated harshly under regime that is only semi-democratic, there is still more space for organizing than at home (Pangsapa 2009).

7 See, for example, Gleeson (2010).

8 The total number of Mexicans with consular ID cards is not clear, since the official public data reports the number issued each year, without accounting for those that are renewals or are due to changes of address. However, the number is large - according to the 2010 Informe de Gobierno, consulates have issued 9.4 million since 2000. For further discussion of the politics of these ID cards, see Varsanyi (2007). The El Salvadoran consular network makes an even more distinctive service available to its citizens in the United States, convening meetings to provide direct personal technical assistance to navigate US immigration procedures, which include a special category called “temporary protected status” that was created in the 1990s in response to earlier Central American migrant-led campaigns for regularization following wartime displacement. (personal communication, Prof. Cecilia Rivas, UC Santa Cruz, October, 2010).

9 According to the Daily Star (2008): “More than 500 Asian cleaners and workers staged street demonstrations until police dispersed them in the evening by using tear gas and batons and arrested several workers… Criticising the government's lack of control over the cleaning companies, several Kuwaiti MPs said instead of looking for solutions to end the strikes, the government has started looking at possibilities of recruiting labourers from other Asian countries, except Bangladeshis or Pakistanis as they are known to have records of resorting to violence. MP Saleh Ashoor held the government entirely responsible for the violence that sparked through the recent labour unrest. He said it is the government that is in charge of executing contracts and granting tenders to companies and hence should have exercised effective supervisory control over their functioning. Ashoor said demands put forth by the striking labourers were completely legal and entirely humane. He also slammed the employers' inhumane practice of retaining the employees' bankcards and paying them far less than what they were contracted for.”


11 For more information on the World Social Forum on Migration, see http://www.migration4development.org/content/4th-world-social-forum-migration-2010-quito-ecuador.


13 See, for example, Sen, et al (2004).
For overviews of official governmental strategies for engaging with diasporas, see Rannveig Agunias (2009).


In practice the actual number of countries is smaller if one takes into account the many restrictions, such as the 14 countries that limit voting to citizens who are abroad as government officials.

These countries include: Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Italy, Mozambique, Panama and Portugal (IDEA/IFE, 2007: 28).

Official accounts of the overseas voting process take this for granted (Philippines Committee on Overseas Absentee Voting, 2007). The Philippines migrant experience is also distinguished by their hundreds of thousands international contract seafarers, who face extreme obstacles to voting rights, and continue to be subject to forced repatriation of remittances (Prof. Steve McKay, UC Santa Cruz, September, 2010, personal communication).

Note a similarly pattern of low voter turnout among Dominican citizens abroad (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). Official data sources generally do not facilitate estimates of migrant turnout in national elections. The most definitive source measures migrant electoral participation in terms of their share of registered, rather than eligible voters (IDEA/IFE 2007). Yet obstacles to registration are often a major reason for low migrant election turnout.

For analysis of the democratic contribution of diasporic organizations of Dominicans and Salvadorans, see Itzigsohn and Villacrés (2008). For assessment of Mexican hometown associations’ translocal accountability impacts, see Burgess (2010), Bada (2010) and Fox and Bada (2008).

For a comparison of Mexico and Morocco, see Ishkander (2007), who contrasts the failure of top-down efforts to channel migrant investments into poorly-conceived business ventures with more successful migrant-led social infrastructure initiatives. See also de Haas and Vezzoli (2010), who observe: “The fragmentary and multilingual composition of Moroccan HTAs, coupled with the lower levels of literacy and education among Moroccan migrants compared to Mexicans migrants, has given them weaker lobbying power in the receiving countries than Mexicans in the United States. However, Moroccan migrant organizations seem to have a stronger focus on development in regions of origin than their Mexican counterparts.”

For overviews of remittances and development issues in Mexico, see García Zamora (2009) and Fernández de Castro, García Zamora and Freyer (2009). In Latin America more generally, see García Zamora and Orozco (2009). For 2008, after several years of effort, the share of Mexico’s Three for One projects considered “productive” reached 4% of the total number of projects (100) and 6.4% of federal program funding (only US$2.6 million) Thanks to Xóchitl Bada for this data.

Political caution is also required, to avoid controversy that would cause one of the three levels of government involved to exercise their veto power (the Three-for-One program involves federal, state and municipal government contributions – and therefore signoff power). Mexican states that have been slow to go through transitions to democracy have lagged noticeably behind in their inclusion of independently-organized migrant citizens in Three-for-One projects, as in the case of Oaxaca.

See the report from a participatory binational workshop focused specifically on this issue, including an official manual for promoting the “social oversight” of Three-for-One projects at: http://www.mexicotaller.org/Documentos.html
29 This percentage is similar to the Mexican Three-for-One program’s share of the Social Development Ministry’s budget.

30 See Lokku and Herrgott (2009).

31 A similar dynamic could emerge as part of a potential US immigration reform, though so far, analogous processes of conditionality have not been linked to development aid or migrant organizations. At the same time, however, the Mexican government has certainly tightened up its southern border controls over the past decade.

32 See Fox and Haight (2010).

33 Ayon argues that the Mexican government’s multi-faceted strategy for engaging the diaspora successfully depoliticized the relationship: “Mexican authorities had outmaneuvered and ultimately overwhelmed opposition-minded migrant activists with the state’s power to reach out and even reshape the organized diaspora. Over the course of three [presidential] administrations and a fundamental regime change, the underlying interest of the Mexican state in deflecting transnational migrant activism away from domestic politics had prevailed...” (Ayon 2010: 245). See also Délanio (2009), Ishkander (2010) and Smith (2009).

34 http://www.mfasia.org/

35 See http://nnirr.org/

36 See http://nalacc.org/